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The Miller Revolution 




In a series of cases culminating in Miller v. Alabama, the United States Supreme 
Court has limited the extent to which juveniles may be exposed to the harshest criminal 
sentences. Scholars have addressed discrete components of these recent Court decisions, 
from their Eighth Amendment methodology to their effect upon state legislation. In this 
Article, I draw upon that scholarship to make a broader claim: the Miller trilogy has 
revolutionized juvenile justice.  While we have begun to see only the most inchoate signs 
of this revolution in practice, this Article endeavors to describe what this revolution may 
look like both in the immediate term and in years to come. Part I demonstrates how the 
United States went from being the leader in progressive juvenile justice to being an 
international outlier in the severity of its juvenile sentencing. Part II examines the Miller 
decision, as well as its immediate predecessor cases, and explains why Miller demands a 
capacious reading. Part III explores the post-Miller revolution in juvenile justice that is 
afoot. Specifically, Part III makes the case for two immediate corollaries that flow from 
Miller, each of which is groundbreaking in its own right: 1) the creation of procedural 
safeguards for juveniles facing life without parole (“LWOP”) comparable to those 
recommended for adults facing the death penalty; and 2) the elimination of mandatory 
minimums for juveniles altogether. Finally, Part III identifies ways in which juvenile 
justice advocates can leverage the moral leadership of the Miller Court to seek future 
reform in three key areas: juvenile transfer laws; presumptive sentencing guidelines as 
they apply to children; and juvenile conditions of confinement.  
 
Introduction 
A juvenile justice revolution in America is underway. After decades of 
increasingly punitive treatment of juveniles in our criminal justice system,1 the tide is 
turning. Legislatures, courts and executive actors are reconsidering the propriety of 
criminal laws as they apply to children in fundamental ways. And in one way or another,2 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
* Associate Professor of Law, Columbus School of Law, The Catholic University of America. Many 
people provided feedback on this paper, and I am grateful for their comments and suggestions. In 
particular, I thank the participants in the Wisconsin Law Review Symposium, the faculty of the Florida 
State Law School, where I workshopped this paper, as well as the following individuals: Nancy Hoeffel, 
Lea Johnston, Andrew Ferguson, and Megan La Belle. Megan Chester provided valuable research 
assistance. 
1 See infra Part I. 
2 There is great debate over whether the Supreme Court can generate social change or whether it responds 
to social change once it is underway. That debate is not the focus of my paper. For a general discussion of 
those issues see Gerald N. Rosenberg, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE 
(1991) (questioning whether the Supreme Court can bring about meaningful social change); Mark Tushnet, 
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this revolution can be linked to the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Miller v. 
Alabama,3 in which the Court held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits mandatory life 
without parole (“LWOP”) sentences for juveniles – even those convicted of homicide.4 
Following Roper v. Simmons5 and Graham v. Florida,6 Miller was the last of three recent 
Supreme Court cases dealing with juvenile sentencing. Together these cases – which I 
refer to as the Miller trilogy – stand for the proposition that children are constitutionally 
different for sentencing purposes, and state practices must reflect that fact.  
This Article maintains that Miller was a revolutionary decision and that it 
portends a tremendous shift in juvenile justice policy and practice.7 Some scholars and 
advocates have begun to recognize the outer limits of the Miller decision and have 
articulated expansive readings of the Miller trilogy. For example, Professor Will Berry 
has argued that the Miller call for individualized sentencing for juveniles should apply to 
all instances where the defendant faces a death-in-custody sentence.8 Professor Barry 
Feld has called for legislation that would respond to Graham and Miller by imposing a 
categorical “Youth Discount” at sentencing.9 Many have called for a re-examination of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Some Legacies of Brown v. Board of Education, 90 VA. L. REV. 1693 (2004)(suggesting that the Court can 
articulate powerful principles of social reform despite constraints imposed on judicial branch); Brian K. 
Landsberg, Enforcing Desegregation: A Case Study of Federal District Court Power and Social Change in 
Macon County Alabama, 48 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 867 (2014)(suggesting that despite judicial constraints 
courts can generate social reform). 
3 132 S.Ct. 2455 (2012).  
4 132 S.Ct. 2455, 2469.  
5 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
6 560 U.S. 48 (2010). 
7 In the wake of Miller, courts and scholars have grappled with the often-messy questions of 
implementation: Is Miller retroactive? Are life sentences or “de facto” life sentences also within the 
purview of Graham and Miller? How do states that long ago abolished parole afford juveniles relief under 
Graham and Miller? These questions are vitally important, and I have weighed in on some of them in prior 
works. See generally, Cara H. Drinan, Graham on the Ground, 87 WASH. L. REV. 51 (2012); Cara H. 
Drinan, Misconstruing Graham & Miller, 91 WASH U. L. REV. 785 (2014). They are not, however, the 
focus of this Paper. 
8 William W. Berry, III, The Mandate of Miller, 51 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 327 (2014).  
9 Barry C. Feld, Adolescent Criminal Responsibility, Proportionality, and Sentencing Policy: Roper, 
Graham, Miller/Jackson, and the Youth Discount, 31 LAW & INEQ. 263 (2013). 
Spring	  2015	  
Do	  Not	  Cite	  Without	  Author’s	  Permission	  
	   3	  
juvenile justice practices across the board in the wake of Miller.10 The premise of all of 
these arguments -- that the language, logic and science of the Miller decision demand a 
capacious reading – is sound.  
In this Article, I build upon these arguments and identify truly revolutionary 
changes in juvenile justice policy and practice that are possible post-Miller. Some of 
these changes are already underway. For example, one state supreme court has banned 
mandatory sentences for juveniles – across the board – an unthinkable action even as 
recently as the late 20th century.11 Other changes are nascent and demand greater 
exploration so that they can be pursued in the years to come, including repealing 
mandatory juvenile transfer laws and overhauling juvenile conditions of confinement.  
This article proceeds in three parts. Part I demonstrates how this nation went from 
being the leader in progressive juvenile justice to being an international outlier in the 
severity of its juvenile sentencing. In answering this question, Part I traces the 
development of mandatory juvenile sentences in this country and identifies two forces 
driving that development: the practice of transferring juvenile cases to adult court and the 
emergence of determinate sentencing schemes. Part II examines the Miller decision, as 
well as its immediate predecessor cases, at a granular level and explains why Miller 
demands a capacious reading. Having done so, Part III turns to exploring the post-Miller 
revolution in juvenile justice that is afoot. Part III includes two sub-parts. In the first sub-
section, I make the case for two immediate corollaries that flow from Miller, each of 
which is revolutionary in its own right: 1) the creation of procedural safeguards for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 See e.g., Elizabeth S. Scott, “Children are Different:” Constitutional Values and Justice Policy, 11 Ohio 
St. J. Crim. L. 71, 71 (2013)(arguing that “the Court has embraced a developmental model of youth crime 
regulation and elevated this approach to one that is grounded in constitutional values and principles”).  
11 See infra notes __-__ and accompanying text. 
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children facing life without parole (“LWOP”) comparable to those recommended for 
adults facing the death penalty; and 2) the elimination of mandatory minimums for 
children altogether. While these shifts in juvenile justice practice are radical, they are 
readily defensible post-Miller.  In the second section of Part III, I turn to the juvenile 
justice frontier and articulate several revolutionary changes that can and should be 
explored post-Miller. These include repealing mandatory transfer laws, changes to 
presumptive sentencing guidelines as they apply to children, and rethinking juvenile 
conditions of confinement. If state actors undertake efforts of this kind post-Miller, such 
actions could set in motion a return to the rehabilitative juvenile justice model this 
country began with more than a century ago. In conclusion, I address the issue of political 
feasibility and identify data that suggests state actors can partake in the Miller revolution 
that is underway.   
Part I: The Arc of American Juvenile Justice: From Progressive Leader to 
International Outlier 
 
 Juvenile courts and the distinct treatment of juveniles charged with crimes are 
now established features of the American criminal justice system – features that have 
been emulated globally.12 In recent years, however, two developments in American 
criminal procedure converged to expose juveniles to mandatory sentences, in some cases 
extreme ones: 1) the transfer of juvenile delinquents to adult criminal court and 2) the 
trend toward determinate sentencing schemes. These two developments were the perfect 
storm that generated mandatory, extreme sentences for children in the criminal justice 
system. In this Part of the paper, I provide a brief historical overview of American 
juvenile justice, and then I turn to illustrating how juvenile transfer laws and determinate 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Franklin E. Zimring and David S. Tanenhaus, Introduction, in CHOOSING THE FUTURE FOR AMERICAN 
JUVENILE JUSTICE 1 (Franklin E. Zimring and David S. Tanenhaus , eds., 2014).  
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sentencing schemes together exposed our youth to the most severe sanctions without any 
room for discretion.  
A. General Overview of Juvenile Justice 
Juvenile justice is now a well-established feature of our criminal justice system. 
Established in Illinois in 1899, every jurisdiction in the country has a separate juvenile 
justice system.13 Prompted by Progressive-era reformers, the early juvenile court was 
attentive to the differences between adults and children and emphasized age-appropriate 
punishment and treatment for juvenile offenders.14  As described by Aaron Kupchik, 
“Founders of the juvenile justice system believed that juveniles who misbehaved were 
products of pathological environments rather than intrinsically evil. The target of the 
juvenile justice system was the deprivation, not the depravation, of delinquent youth. The 
court’s mission was to resocialize youth and provide them with the necessary tools for 
adopting a moral lifestyle.”15  Over time, several features emerged as defining attributes 
of the juvenile justice system: 1) a degree of informality relative to criminal court 
proceedings; 2) great discretion afforded to the judge who was able to tailor the 
intervention to the particular juvenile in each case; and 3) a fundamental shared belief 
that childhood is a period of dependency and risk where the state had a role to play for a 
child in jeopardy.16 Today, developed countries around the world have installed juvenile 
justice systems modeled after the American system.17  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Franklin E. Zimring and David S. Tanenhaus, Introduction, in CHOOSING THE FUTURE FOR AMERICAN 
JUVENILE JUSTICE 1 (Franklin E. Zimring and David S. Tanenhaus , eds., 2014).  
14 Aaron Kupchik, JUDGING JUVENILES 11 (2006).  
15 Aaron Kupchik, JUDGING JUVENILES 11 (2006). 
16 Franklin E. Zimring, American Juvenile Justice, 6-7 (2005); Aaron Kupchik, JUDGING JUVENILES 51 
(2006).  
17 Franklin E. Zimring and David S. Tanenhaus, Introduction, in CHOOSING THE FUTURE FOR AMERICAN 
JUVENILE JUSTICE 1 (Franklin E. Zimring and David S. Tanenhaus , eds., 2014); see also Frank E. Zimring, 
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Professor Terry Maroney has described three primary phases in the development of 
American juvenile justice prior to the immediate post-Miller era that we are entering.18 
The first phase, discussed above, was prompted by the rehabilitative ideal of the late 
nineteenth century, and it expressed optimism about the juvenile’s capacity for change 
and society’s obligation to support that change.19 By the middle of the twentieth century, 
recognizing the evolving punitive nature of “civil” juvenile proceedings, the Supreme 
Court granted juveniles – for better or worse20 – many of the procedural safeguards 
associated with the adult criminal justice system.21 The zenith of this “due process era” of 
juvenile justice was the Supreme Court’s decision in In re Gault,22 holding that juveniles 
had the right to counsel during delinquency proceedings.23 Finally, most recently, 
American juvenile justice shifted radically to a posture of fear and containment. In the 
1990’s, fueled by criminologists who predicted a wave of juvenile “super-predators” and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
AMERICAN JUVENILE JUSTICE 33 (2005)(“No legal institution in Anglo-American legal history has achieved 
such universal acceptance among the diverse legal systems of the industrial democracies.”). 
18 Terry A. Maroney, The Once and Future Juvenile Brain, in CHOOSING THE FUTURE FOR AMERICAN 
JUVENILE JUSTICE 189 (Franklin E. Zimring and David S. Tanenhaus , eds., 2014). Juvenile justice scholars 
agree that we have entered a new era of policy in the last decade. See e.g, Id. (“We surely now have moved 
into a new era of juvenile justice.”); see also Elizabeth S. Scott, Miller v. Alabama and the (Past and) 
Future of Juvenile Crime Regulation, 31 Law & Ineq. 535 (2013)(discussing the moral panic that drove 
policies of the 1990’s and the shifts that have emerged in the last decade).   
19 Terry A. Maroney, The Once and Future Juvenile Brain, in CHOOSING THE FUTURE FOR AMERICAN 
JUVENILE JUSTICE 189 (Franklin E. Zimring and David S. Tanenhaus , eds., 2014). 
20 Some academics have suggested that juvenile defendants have fared worse in the post-Gault era. See e.g., 
Franklin E. Zimring and David S. Tanenhaus, On Strategy and Tactics for Contemporary Reforms, in 
CHOOSING THE FUTURE FOR AMERICAN JUVENILE JUSTICE 231-232 (Franklin E. Zimring and David S. 
Tanenhaus , eds., 2014)(describing the contrast between an early juvenile court where the judge had 
tremendous power and discretion and the post-Gault expansion of prosecutorial power at the expense of 
judicial and probation authority).  
21 Terry A. Maroney, The Once and Future Juvenile Brain, in CHOOSING THE FUTURE FOR AMERICAN 
JUVENILE JUSTICE 189 (Franklin E. Zimring and David S. Tanenhaus , eds., 2014). 
22 387 U.S.1 (1967). 
23 23 Terry A. Maroney, The Once and Future Juvenile Brain, in CHOOSING THE FUTURE FOR AMERICAN 
JUVENILE JUSTICE 189 (Franklin E. Zimring and David S. Tanenhaus , eds., 2014). 
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skyrocketing homicide rates, state laws shifted to expose children to ever-harsher 
procedures and punishments.24 
By the beginning of the 21st century, the United States was an international outlier in 
its harsh sentences for juvenile criminal defendants. Until 2005, the United States was the 
only developed country that subjected children to the death penalty,25 and today we are 
the only nation that employs juvenile life without parole.26 Two recent developments, in 
particular, led to the practice of extreme sentences for juvenile offenders: juvenile 
transfer laws which removed children from juvenile proceedings and placed them under 
the jurisdiction of adult criminal courts and the general trend toward determinate 
sentencing schemes.  
B. Juvenile Transfer Law: Kids in Adult Court 
From the inception of the juvenile court to the mid-1970’s, a child who was accused 
of committing a crime was initially and usually processed in the juvenile justice system.27 
In that system, the judge enjoyed great power and flexibility relative to today’s criminal 
courts judges. The “ethic of parens patriae” permeated the juvenile court and typically 
prompted judges to provide social services that were lacking for the youth offender.28 In 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Terry A. Maroney, The Once and Future Juvenile Brain, in CHOOSING THE FUTURE FOR AMERICAN 
JUVENILE JUSTICE 189(Franklin E. Zimring and David S. Tanenhaus , eds., 2014). See generally Franklin E. 
Zimring, American Youth Violence: A Cautionary Tale, in CHOOSING THE FUTURE FOR AMERICAN 
JUVENILE JUSTICE 7 (Franklin E. Zimring and David S. Tanenhaus , eds., 2014); see also Elizabeth S. Scott, 
Miller v. Alabama and the (Past and) Future of Juvenile Crime Regulation, 31 Law & Ineq. 535, 537-541.  
25 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575 (“Our determination that the death penalty is disproportionate 
punishment for offenders under 18 finds confirmation in the stark reality that the United States is the only 
country in the world that continues to give official sanction to the juvenile death penalty.”).  
26 Miller v. Alabama, Brief of Amici Curiae Amnesty International, et al. in Support of Petitioners, 2012 
WL 174238, 5-6 (Jan. 16, 2012). 
27 Aaron Kupchik, JUDGING JUVENILES, 1 (2006).  
28 Aaron Kupchik, JUDGING JUVENILES 11 (2006)(“The founders of the juvenile court imagined a judge and 
probation officer, assisted by medical and psychological treatment professionals, diagnosing and remedying 
youth’s problems without the need to constrict due process rules.”).  
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this context, it was the juvenile judge’s decision when and if to transfer a child to adult 
court.29 Moreover, the transfer decision involved a hearing at which the state had to 
persuade the juvenile judge that the juvenile was not amenable to rehabilitation, had 
committed a crime too serious for adjudication in juvenile court given its punitive limits, 
or both.30 Transfer was not common; it was the exception. In recent years, though, an 
increasing number of children have been transferred from juvenile court to adult court. 
This trend, and the psychology accompanying it, has changed the model of criminal 
justice for kids altogether.  
Beginning in the 1970’s, states amended their laws in a number of ways, making it 
easier for children to be prosecuted in adult criminal court.31 Some state laws reduced the 
age at which a juvenile judge was authorized to transfer a child to adult court, while 
others state laws automatically excluded certain juvenile defendants from the juvenile 
court’s jurisdiction based upon the child’s age or the charged offense.32 Finally, some 
states amended their laws to vest the prosecutor with unilateral power to make the 
juvenile transfer decision.33  
This last category of transfer laws, known as “direct file” laws,34 has been most 
problematic, as scholars and the Supreme Court have noted. Professor Zimring, for 
example, has posited that get-tough transfer legislation from the 1990’s may have been 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Franklin E. Zimring, The Power Politics of Juvenile Court Transfer in the 1990’s, in CHOOSING THE 
FUTURE FOR AMERICAN JUVENILE JUSTICE 42 (Franklin E. Zimring and David S. Tanenhaus , eds., 
2014)(“The long-standing method of transfer was a hearing held before a juvenile court judge who had the 
power to waive the juvenile court’s jurisdiction.”).  
30 Cf. Franklin E. Zimring, AMERICAN JUVENILE JUSTICE 141-144 (2005)(discussing mission of juvenile 
court as being its primary limitation in that some juvenile cases warrant a punishment response the juvenile 
court cannot impose).  
 
31 Aaron Kupchik, JUDGING JUVENILES 1; 154-159 (2006)(discussing the three primary methods for transfer 
of jurisdiction from juvenile to adult court).  
32 Aaron Kupchik, JUDGING JUVENILES 1 (2006). 
33 Aaron Kupchik, JUDGING JUVENILES 1 (2006). 
34 Aaron Kupchik, JUDGING JUVENILES 156 (2006)(defining the process and explaining its problems) 
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“an attempt to push the allocation of power in juvenile courts closer to the model of 
prosecutorial domination that has been characteristic of criminal courts in this United 
States for a generation.”35 Whether intentional or not, direct file laws certainly “[create] 
more power or less work for juvenile court prosecutors, or both.”36 In the Miller decision, 
the Supreme Court also noted the dangers of direct file laws for juveniles: “several States 
at times lodge this decision exclusively in the hands of prosecutors, again with no 
statutory mechanism for judicial reevaluation. And those ‘prosecutorial discretion laws 
are usually silent regarding standards, protocols, or appropriate considerations for 
decisionmaking.’”37   
In sum, while state transfer laws vary in their scope and mechanism, in the aggregate, 
they result in many children being tried in adult court and exposed to generally applicable 
penalty provisions. 
C. Determinate Sentencing Schemes: A Parallel Trend 
Around the same time that states were amending their transfer laws, making it easier 
to prosecute children in adult court, the state and federal governments also implemented 
mandatory sentencing schemes for adult offenders.38 Beginning in the 1970’s, lawmakers 
and politicians embraced a tough-on-crime stance across the board. By the 1990’s, 
criminologists predicted increasing rates of violent crime and the emergence of a juvenile 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Franklin E. Zimring, The Power Politics of Juvenile Court Transfer in the 1990’s, in CHOOSING THE 
FUTURE FOR AMERICAN JUVENILE JUSTICE 44 (Franklin E. Zimring and David S. Tanenhaus , eds., 2014). 
36 Franklin E. Zimring, The Power Politics of Juvenile Court Transfer in the 1990’s, in CHOOSING THE 
FUTURE FOR AMERICAN JUVENILE JUSTICE 44 (Franklin E. Zimring and David S. Tanenhaus , eds., 
2014)(“So the proliferation of direct file provisions is really an enhancement of prosecutorial power as 
much as it is a legislative judgment about which juveniles should be transferred to criminal court, because 
it is contingent on prosecutorial charging discretions.”). Id. at 45.  
37 Miller, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 2474 (citing Dept. of Justice, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency 
Prevention, P. Griffin, S. Addie, B. Adams, & K. Firestine, Trying Juveniles as Adults: An Analysis of 
State Transfer Laws and Reporting 5 (2011).). 
38 The Miller Court noted that state legislators were not necessarily considering the interaction of these 
separate legislative efforts, and yet the consequences were dire for juveniles. Miller at 2472.  
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“super-predator.”39 Nationwide, lawmakers responded in several ways, one of which 
entailed shifting from indeterminate sentencing schemes, under which judges had 
discretion regarding a defendant’s sentence, to a scheme that imposed mandatory 
minimums. “On the state level this trend began in New York in 1973, with California and 
Massachusetts following soon thereafter. While the trend toward mandatory minimums in 
the states was gradual, by 1983, 49 of the 50 states had passed such provisions.”40 At the 
same time, states increased the number of crimes on the books41 and eliminated or 
narrowed parole provisions.42  
These two parallel trends created the perfect storm for juveniles in the criminal justice 
system.  State law often made it very easy for a child to be tried in adult court, and once 
that child was in adult court, he was exposed to generally applicable mandatory 
minimums. The two inmates whose cases were addressed by the Miller Court provide 
good illustrations of this dynamic. Kuntrell Jackson was charged with capital felony 
murder, and Arkansas law permitted the prosecutor to charge him as an adult based on 
the nature of the charge itself.43 Once in adult court, a jury convicted Jackson of both 
capital murder and aggravated robbery.44 As the judge noted in Jackson’s case, Arkansas 
law permitted only one sentence: life without parole.45 Similarly, in Evan Miller’s case, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 See Franklin E. Zimring, AMERICAN JUVENILE JUSTICE 105-106 (2005). 
40 Special Report to the Congress: Mandatory Minimum Penalties in the Federal Criminal Justice System, 
available at: http://www.ussc.gov/news/congressional-testimony-and-reports/mandatory-minimum-
penalties/special-report-congress.  
41 Cf. Gary Fields and John R. Emshwiller, Many Failed Efforts to Count Nation’s Federal Criminal Laws, 
THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, July 23, 2001, available at: 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304319804576389601079728920 (estimating that 
there are at least 3000 federal criminal laws and recognizing that the true number is probably beyond 
estimation). 
42 Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Parole: Corpse or Phoenix?, 50 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 303, 315-320 (2013)(describing 
the “death of parole” at the state and federal level). 
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the prosecutor moved to transfer his case to adult court, succeeded in that transfer, and 
charged Miller with murder in the course of arson.46 A jury found Miller guilty, and 
again, Alabama law permitted only one sentence: life without parole.47  
And the statutes at issue in Miller were not outliers. As the Miller Court noted, 
twenty-eight states and the Federal Government imposed mandatory life-without-parole 
on some juveniles convicted of murder in adult court.48 At the same time, the Court noted 
that many state transfer laws left no room for judicial discretion: “Of the [twenty-nine] 
relevant jurisdictions, about half place at least some juvenile homicide offenders in adult 
court automatically, with no apparent opportunity to seek transfer to juvenile court.”49 
Thus the Miller Court squarely addressed the two dynamics that I have discussed in this 
Part of the paper: parallel state trends toward trying children in adult court and toward 
imposing mandatory minimums. These two trends converged to expose our nation’s 
children to severe, mandatory sentences.  
By 2005, the United States Supreme Court took up the issue of extreme juvenile 
sentences, and in the Miller trilogy, the Court began to scale back the extent to which 
states could impose those sentences on children.  
Part II: The Miller Trilogy 
Part II begins by examining the Miller decision, as well as its immediate 
predecessor cases, at a granular level. Part II then explains why Miller demands a 
capacious reading by courts and scholars.   A. The Miller Trilogy: Roper, Graham & Miller 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 Miller at 2462.  
47 Id. at 2462-2463.  
48 Id. at 2471. 
49 Id. at 2474. 
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The road to Miller began with Roper v. Simmons in 2005.50 In Roper, the Supreme 
Court held that the practice of executing those who had committed their crimes prior to 
the age of 18 was unconstitutional.51 The Roper Court employed longstanding Eighth 
Amendment analysis for the capital setting: it examined juveniles as a group and asked 
whether the use of execution was proportionate given the diminished culpability of youth 
offenders.52 Further, in assessing proportionality, the Court looked at the “objective 
indicia of consensus, as expressed in particular by the enactments of legislatures that have 
addressed the question” and then exercised its own “independent judgment” as to 
“whether the death penalty is a disproportionate punishment for juveniles.”53 In that 
process, the Roper Court found that a majority of states forbid the practice of juvenile 
capital punishment; that it was rarely employed in the states that permitted it; and that the 
national trend was moving away from subjecting juveniles to the death penalty.54 On this 
basis, the Court held that the Eighth Amendment forbids juvenile execution.  
Having demonstrated that the practice was inconsistent with “evolving standards of 
decency,” the Roper Court proceeded to render its own judgment regarding the penalty as 
it applied to juveniles.55 The Court focused on three reasons why juveniles are 
categorically different from adults and thus should not be exposed to capital punishment: 
they lack maturity; they are far more susceptible to external pressures; and their moral 
character is still fluid.56 Finally, the Court held that, in light of juveniles’ diminished 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005). 
51 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005).  
52 543 U.S. 551, 564. 
53 543 U.S. 551, 564.  
54 543 U.S. 551, 567-568. 
55 543 U.S. 551, 568. 
56 543 U.S. 551, 569-570. 
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culpability, neither stated rationale for the death penalty, deterrence or retribution, was 
adequate justification.57 
Two aspects of the Roper decision are noteworthy in the context of Miller and its 
import. First, the Roper Court drew upon science and the proven fact that children are not 
just small adults. The Court’s discussion of the unique attributes of children was 
anchored in social science work, documenting the inchoate nature of the adolescent 
brain.58 The scientific bent to the Roper Court’s decision laid important foundation for 
both the Graham and Miller decisions. 
Second, the Roper Court noted that the United States was out of sync with the rest of 
the world in its use of juvenile capital punishment. While the Court explained that its 
decision rested on an analysis of legislative trends coupled with its own independent 
judgment, the Court said: “Our determination that the death penalty is disproportionate 
punishment for offenders under 18 finds confirmation in the stark reality that the United 
States is the only country in the world that continues to give official sanction to the 
juvenile death penalty.”59 The Roper Court’s reference to American sentencing practices 
relative to the international arena was also important to the Graham and Miller decisions, 
as those cases, too, examined a sentencing practice foreign to most other developed 
countries.   
Five years after Roper, in Graham v. Florida, the Court took up the question whether 
a life-without-parole sentence was permissible for a non-homicide juvenile offender.60 
Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy held that the Constitution categorically forbids 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 543 U.S. 551, 571-572. 
58 543 U.S. 551, 569-570 (discussing the lack of maturity and recklessness, susceptibility to negative 
outside influences, and transient character of youth and citing the science behind each point). 
59 543 U.S. 551, 575. 
60 560 U.S. 48 (2010). 
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such a sentence.61 First, he explained that the Eighth Amendment bars both “barbaric” 
punishments and punishments that are disproportionate to the crime committed.62 Within 
the latter category, the Court explained that its cases fell into one of two classifications: 
(1) cases challenging the length of term-of-years sentences given all the circumstances in 
a particular case and (2) cases where the Court has considered categorical restrictions on 
the death penalty.63 Because Graham's case challenged “a particular type of sentence” 
and its application to “an entire class of offenders who have committed a range of 
crimes,” the Court found the categorical approach appropriate and relied upon its recent 
death penalty case law for guidance.64  
Just as the Court had done in Roper, the Graham Court looked to objective indicia of 
national consensus, beginning with relevant legislation regarding juvenile life without 
parole. Justice Kennedy explained that while thirty-seven states, the District of Columbia, 
and the federal government permitted life-without-parole sentences for non-homicide 
juvenile offenders, the actual sentencing practices of these jurisdictions told another 
story. Based on the evidence before it, the Court determined that, at the time of the 
decision, there were 123 non-homicide juvenile offenders serving a life-without-parole 
sentence nationwide and seventy-seven of them were in Florida prisons.65 Given the 
“exceedingly rare” incidence of the punishment in question, the Court held that there was 
a national consensus against life-without-parole sentences for non-homicide juvenile 
offenders.66  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 560 U.S. 48, 79. 
62 560 U.S. 48, 59. 
63 560 U.S. 48, 59-61. 
64 560 U.S. 48, 61-62. 
65 560 U.S. 48, 64.   
66 560 U.S. 48, 67. 
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Again consistent with the Roper approach, the Graham Court acknowledged that 
“community consensus” was “entitled to great weight,” but it proceeded to render its own 
judgment regarding the constitutionality of Graham's sentence.67 In this regard, the Court 
focused on two aspects of the case: first, the uniqueness of juvenile offenders--
specifically their lessened culpability and their greater capacity for reform --and second, 
the historical treatment of non-homicide crimes as less severe than crimes where a victim 
is killed.68  Looking at these two features, the Court reasoned: “It follows that, when 
compared to an adult murderer, a juvenile offender who did not kill or intend to kill has a 
twice diminished moral culpability.”69 At the same time, when the Court examined the 
various justifications for any criminal sanction, it determined that none could justify life 
without parole for defendants like Graham. Accordingly, the Court held: 
A State is not required to guarantee eventual freedom to a juvenile offender convicted 
of a nonhomicide crime. What the State must do, however, is give defendants like 
Graham some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity 
and rehabilitation . . . . The Eighth Amendment does not foreclose the possibility that 
persons convicted of nonhomicide crimes committed before adulthood will remain 
behind bars for life. It does forbid States from making the judgment at the outset that 
those offenders never will be fit to reenter society.70 
 
Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court found life-without-parole sentences unconstitutional 
for juvenile non-homicide offenders and, with its decision, entitled Terrance Graham and 
those similarly situated to a new sentence. 
As the Supreme Court itself had acknowledged in Graham, its decision applied to a 
small number of inmates nationwide.71 At the same time, more than 2000 inmates 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 560 U.S. 48, 67. 
68 560 U.S. 48, 67. 
69 560 U.S. 48, 69. 
70 560 U.S. 48, 75. 
71 560 U.S. 48, 64 (“Thus, adding the individuals counted by the study to those we have been able to locate 
independently, there are 123 juvenile nonhomicide offenders serving life without parole sentences. A 
significant majority of those, 77 in total, are serving sentences imposed in Florida. . .The other 46 are 
Spring	  2015	  
Do	  Not	  Cite	  Without	  Author’s	  Permission	  
	   16	  
nationwide were serving life without parole on the basis of a juvenile homicide 
conviction. In this sense, the Graham decision begged the question whether the Eighth 
Amendment also precluded life without parole for juveniles convicted of homicide 
offenses. Only two years later, the Court took up that question in Miller v. Alabama. In an 
opinion authored by Justice Kagan, the majority held that the Eighth Amendment bars 
mandatory life without parole for juveniles – even those convicted of a homicide 
offense.72  
 The Miller Court explained that its decision rested on two relevant strands of 
precedent: 1) its line of cases adopting categorical bans on certain sentencing practices 
and 2) its line of cases requiring certain procedural safeguards in the capital sentencing 
context.73 As to the first line of cases, the Court viewed its ban on mandatory life without 
parole for juveniles as analogous to its ban on the death penalty for the mentally retarded 
or its ban on life without parole for non-homicide juvenile offenders. In both cases, the 
Court had determined that the sentence at issue was disproportionate in light of the 
mitigating attributes of the defendant.74 As to the second line of cases, the Miller Court 
explained that, for juveniles, life without parole is analogous to the death penalty: “[Life 
without parole] is an ‘especially harsh punishment for a juvenile,’ because he will almost 
inevitably serve ‘more years and a greater percentage of his life in prison than an adult 
offender. . .The penalty when imposed on a teenager, as compared with an older person, 
is therefore ‘the same…in name only.’”75 In light of these two lines of precedent – those 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
imprisoned in just 10 States—California, Delaware, Iowa, Louisiana, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, 
Oklahoma, South Carolina, and Virginia.”)(citations omitted). 
72 132 S.Ct. 2455. 
73 132 S.Ct. 2455, 2463. 
74 132 S.Ct. 2455, 2463-2464. 
75 132 S.Ct. 2455, 2466. 
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finding certain punishments excessive for classes of offenders and those dealing with 
procedural safeguards required in the capital context – the Miller Court forbid the states 
from sentencing juveniles to life without parole under a mandatory sentencing scheme.76  
These three decisions – the Miller trilogy – together stand for the proposition that 
children are different in the eyes of the law, and they send important signals to state 
actors about the propriety of various juvenile justice practices.   B. Courts Should Read Miller Capaciously 
A narrow reading of Miller says that juveniles may not be sentenced to life without 
parole under a mandatory sentencing scheme – that the sentence is still permissible, but 
states must implement a new process for its use.77 However, the language, logic and 
science of the decision demand a broader, richer reading.  
To begin, the four dissenting Justices in Miller recognized the decision for what it 
was – nothing short of revolutionary. The Chief Justice posited that “[t]he principle 
behind today’s decision seems to be only that because juveniles are different from adults, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 132 S.Ct. 2455, 2466. (“[T]he mandatory penalty schemes at issue here prevent the sentencer from taking 
account of these central considerations. By removing youth from the balance—by subjecting a juvenile to 
the same life-without-parole sentence applicable to an adult—these laws prohibit a sentencing authority 
from assessing whether the law's harshest term of imprisonment proportionately punishes a juvenile 
offender. That contravenes Graham’s (and also Roper’s) foundational principle: that imposition of a State's 
most severe penalties on juvenile offenders cannot proceed as though they were not children.”).  
77See e.g., Chambers v. State, 831 N.W.2d 311, 328-330 (Minn. 2013)(discussing reasons why Miller 
should be read as merely a procedural rule and thus not retroactively applicable). The United States 
Supreme Court recently granted certiorari in order to resolve a split on the question whether Miller was 
procedural and thus not retroactively applicable or substantive and thus retroactive. George Toca v. 
Louisiana, USSC No. 14-6381, (cert. granted Dec. 12, 2014). In an unusual development, though, the 
Orleans Parish District Attorney’s office agreed to vacate Toca’s murder conviction. Toca had maintained 
his innocence for years. John Simerman, George Toca, La. Inmate at Center of Debate on Juvenile Life 
Sentences, to Go Free, THE ADVOCATE, Jan. 30, 2015, available at: 
http://theadvocate.com/news/neworleans/11462053-148/george-toca-louisiana-inmate-at. Toca’s release 
moots the Supreme Court case, and it remains to be see when the Court may revisit this important issue. 
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they must be sentenced differently,”78 and that such a principle and the process the 
majority employed in applying it  “has no discernible end point.”79 Similarly, Justice 
Thomas wrote that Miller “lays the groundwork for future incursions on the States’ 
authority to sentence criminals.”80  
Beyond the fact that the dissenting Justices recognized the breadth of the decision, 
there are at least four reasons why an expansive reading is warranted. First, the Miller 
Court (and the work that the Graham Court had done in laying the foundation for Miller) 
was an enormous break with Eighth Amendment precedent dealing with non-death, terms 
of years or life sentences, and the Court made this break because it was dealing with 
children. Prior to Graham, the Court had not invalidated a custodial sentence since its 
1983 decision in Solem v. Helm.81 In the three decades between Solem and the 
culmination of the Miller trilogy, the Court examined other proportionality challenges to 
equally draconian custodial sentences – and rejected the inmate’s challenge in each 
instance.82 Equally important, the Court historically had made clear that the bar for 
making such a challenge was an incredibly high one: “Although ‘no penalty is per se 
constitutional,’ the relative lack of objective standards concerning terms of imprisonment 
has meant that “ ‘[o]utside the context of capital punishment, successful challenges to the 
proportionality of particular sentences [are] exceedingly rare.’.”83 Thus, the mere fact that 
the Court agreed with a defendant’s proportionality challenge outside the death penalty 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2482 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting)(emphasis added).  
79 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2481 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).  
80 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2486 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  
81 463 U.S. 277 (1983)(finding unconstitutional life without parole sentence under South Dakota recidivist 
statute for defendant who passed a bad check). 
82 Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S.Ct. 2680 (1990)(rejecting petitioner’s proportionality challenge to sentence 
of mandatory term of life in prison without possibility of parole for possessing more than 650 grams of 
cocaine); Ewing v. California, 123 S.Ct. 1179 (2003)(rejecting petitioner’s proportionality challenge to 
sentence of 25 years to life under state’s three-strikes law).  
83 Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. 2680, 2705.  
Spring	  2015	  
Do	  Not	  Cite	  Without	  Author’s	  Permission	  
	   19	  
context in the Graham and Miller decisions renders the decisions monumental in their 
own right.  
Second, the Miller opinion insists that a child’s developmental environment matters at 
sentencing, and thus state actors cannot comply with the decision in a perfunctory 
manner. The Miller Court explained that mandatory life without parole prevents a 
sentencer from considering precisely those factors most relevant to a juvenile’s 
culpability: “[It] precludes consideration of his chronological age and its hallmark 
features – among them, immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and 
consequences. It prevents taking into account the family and home environment that 
surrounds him – and from which he cannot usually extricate himself – no matter how 
brutal or dysfunctional.”84 At the same time, mandatory life without parole precludes the 
sentencer from considering the role that the juvenile played in the crime and whether he 
may have been charged with a lesser crime but for his immaturity and incompetency in 
navigating the criminal justice process.85 Thus, according to the Miller Court, context 
matters – both life context and crime context – and the sentencer must take both into 
account before imposing the harshest sentence upon a juvenile. 
Related, the Miller Court made clear that in order to appreciate the context in which 
the juvenile has committed a homicide crime (or at least been convicted of one), states 
must employ a process that allows the defendant to explain his life context. The majority 
explained: “the mandatory penalty schemes at issue here prevent the sentencer from 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2468. 
85 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2468-69 (“The features that distinguish juveniles from adults also put them at a 
significant disadvantage in criminal proceedings.”)(citing J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2400-
2401 (2011)).   
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taking account of these central considerations.”86 Further, it noted that, since the early 
1980’s, the Court had recognized youth itself as a relevant mitigating factor at 
sentencing, and that “ ‘[Just as the chronological age of a minor is itself a relevant 
mitigating factor of great weight, so must the background and mental and emotional 
development of a youthful defendant be duly considered’ in assessing his culpability.’”87 
Thus, Miller demands an expansive reading because the decision is so heavily focused on 
the juvenile’s developmental context and procedural safeguards that can illuminate that 
context.  
Third, the Miller Court continued to emphasize – as the Roper and Graham Courts 
had done – science as it relates to juveniles, and that brain science suggests that children 
should be treated differently than adults in the criminal justice process. Referring to its 
earlier decisions in Roper and Graham, the Miller Court explained that “[o]ur decisions 
rested not only on common sense – on what ‘any parent knows’ – but on science and 
social science as well.”88 And the Miller Court then went on to reiterate how that science 
informs legal decisions. It tells us that only a relatively small percentage of juvenile 
offenders later “ ‘develop entrenched patterns of problem behavior.’”89 The same body of 
science tells us that juvenile brains have not developed fully, especially in the areas that 
relate to behavior control.90 And it tells us that, because adolescence is “transient” by 
definition, we can expect juveniles to possess greater capacity for reform and 
rehabilitation than their adult counterparts.91  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2466. 
87 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2467 (quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 116 (1982)).  
88 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2464.  
89 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2464. 
90 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2464. 
91 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2464-2465.  
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Finally, in dicta, the Miller Court suggested that it was concerned with juvenile 
justice practices beyond the juvenile LWOP schemes at issue in the case. For example, 
the Court spent a significant amount of time responding to the states’ claim that youth 
was already taken into account at the transfer stage and thus need not also be taken into 
account at the final sentencing stage.92 The Court explained that many states use 
mandatory transfer systems, and that even in states where the transfer system has some 
discretion, it is often “lodged exclusively in the hands of prosecutors. . .[a]nd those 
‘prosecutorial discretion laws are usually silent regarding standards, protocols, or 
appropriate considerations for decisionmaking.’”93  The majority went on to explain that 
even where judges enjoy some discretion regarding the transfer decision, the system is 
poorly designed to protect the interests of the child. Not only does the judge have limited 
information at the transfer juncture, but also the judge often faces extreme choices 
between a lenient sentence in juvenile court and an extreme one in adult court.94 Finally, 
the Miller majority stated that, in light of its reasoning in the Miller trilogy, juvenile life 
without parole should be a rare sentence – even for juveniles who commit homicide.95 
Thus, the Miller majority made clear in dicta that its opinion was an indictment of 
broader juvenile justice practices and not simply a decision requiring a certain process 
before states could impose life without parole. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2474-2475.  
93 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2474. 
94 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2474. 
95 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2469 (“[G]iven all we have said in Roper, Graham and this decision about children’s 
diminished culpability and heightened capacity for change, we think appropriate occasions for sentencing 
juveniles to this harshest possible penalty will be uncommon.”).  
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For the reasons discussed above, we must read Miller broadly and recognize it as 
the radical decision that it was for purposes of juvenile justice.96 Roper abrogated the 
Court’s relatively recent position on the death penalty for juveniles because science was 
revealing that children were different from a neurological and psychological standpoint.97 
Graham departed from three decades of the Supreme Court rejecting term of years 
proportionality challenges precisely because the case dealt with children. And Miller was 
the apex of these decisions because, again, there the Court concluded that “imposition of 
a State’s most severe penalties on juvenile offenders cannot proceed as though they were 
not children.”98 The Miller trilogy represents the Court’s attempt to provide some outer 
limits on the manner in which children are sentenced and the extent to which they can be 
exposed to the law’s harshest sentences.   
Chief Justice Roberts dismissed the majority’s logic, suggesting that the 
“principle behind today’s decision seems to be only that because juveniles are different 
from adults, they must be sentenced differently.”99 Indeed, that allegation may be true. 
But to the extent that it is, the Miller decision cannot be said to rest on flimsy 
chronological line-drawing. Rather, the Miller opinion reflects nothing more than a return 
to the original American mode of sentencing juveniles – a mode that recognized that 
because children have not yet fully matured they deserve to be treated differently when 
the state metes out a custodial sentence. This recognition is what shaped the early 
American juvenile justice system, and it is the basis upon which our society has deemed 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96 Cf. Nancy Gertner, Miller v. Alabama: What It Is, What It May Be, and What It Is Not, 78 MO. L. REV. 
1041 (2013)(exploring question whether Miller was watershed opinion and concluding that it was for 
juveniles but not for Eighth Amendment analysis more generally).  
97 Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989) (holding that the Eighth Amendment did not prohibit the 
death penalty for 16 and 17-year-old children) abrogated by Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).    
98 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2466. 
99 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2482 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
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juveniles unprepared to vote, to purchase alcohol, and to enlist in the military. Thus, the 
child-centric nature of the Miller trilogy calls on states to rethink the manner in which 
children are treated in criminal proceedings. 
Part III: The Miller Revolution Underway and on the Horizon 
In the wake of the Miller decision, juvenile justice reform is possible – indeed 
happening – in ways that were inconceivable even twenty years ago.100 Part III advances 
the central thesis of this paper: that Miller’s moral leadership has enabled revolutionary 
changes to juvenile justice policy and practice in this country. Part III includes two sub-
parts. In the first sub-section, I make the case for two immediate corollaries that flow 
from Miller, each of which is revolutionary in its own right: 1) the creation of procedural 
safeguards for children facing life without parole (“LWOP”) comparable to those 
recommended for adults facing the death penalty; and 2) the elimination of mandatory 
minimums for children altogether. While these shifts in juvenile justice practice are 
radical, they are readily defensible post-Miller.  In the second section of Part III, I turn to 
the juvenile justice frontier and articulate several revolutionary changes that can and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100 Many scholars have begun to explore the ways in which the Miller trilogy has opened the door to 
legislative and judicial reform of juvenile justice practices. See generally William W. Berry, III, The 
Mandate of Miller, 51 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 327 (2014)(arguing for extension of Miller rule to all cases where 
defendant faces death-in-custody sentence); Emily C. Keller, Constitutional Sentences for Juveniles 
Convicted of Felony Murder in the Wake of Roper, Graham and J.D.B., 11 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 297 
(2012)(arguing pre-Miller that juvenile life without parole sentences are unconstitutional for felony murder 
offenses); Mariko K. Shitama, Note: Bringing Our Children Back from the Land of Nod: Why the Eighth 
Amendment Forbids Condemning Juveniles to Die in Prison for accessorial Felony Murder, 65 FLA. L. 
REV. 813 (2013)(arguing post Miller for same); Janet C. Hoeffel, The Jurisprudence of Death and Youth: 
Now the Twain Should Meet, 46 TEX. TECH L. REV. 29 (2013)(arguing Miller calls into question current 
juvenile transfer laws); Elizabeth S. Scott, “Children are Different:” Constitutional Values and Justice 
Policy, 11 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 71, 101-103 (suggesting Miller requires states to rethink not just sentencing 
but modes of incarceration and rehabilitation altogether); Andrea Wood, Comment: Cruel and Unusual 
Punishment: Confining Juveniles with Adults after Graham and Miller, 61 EMORY L.J. 1445 (2012)(same); 
Amy E. Halbrook, Juvenile Pariahs, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 1 (2013)( positing that Miller undermines the 
legitimacy of mandatory sex offender registries for juveniles); Sarah A. Kellogg, Note: Just Grow Up 
Already: The Diminished Culpability of Juvenile Gang Members After Miller v. Alabama, 55 B.C. L. REV. 
265 (2014)( Miller calls into question general legislation designed to address gang crime as it applies to 
juveniles). 
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should be explored post-Miller. Specifically, I address mandatory transfer laws, 
presumptive sentencing guidelines as they apply to children, and juvenile conditions of 
confinement. 
A. The Miller Revolution Underway 
In this sub-Part, I argue that two juvenile sentencing reform measures, while 
ground-breaking, flow directly from the Miller decision and are readily achievable if not 
already underway: 1) the creation of procedural safeguards for children facing LWOP 
comparable to those recommended for adults facing the death penalty; and 2) and the 
elimination of mandatory minimums for children altogether. I discuss each claim in 
greater detail below. 
1. Miller Suggests a Wiggins Requirement for Juveniles Facing LWOP 
Recognizing that death is distinct from custodial sentences,101 the Supreme Court has 
established constitutionally required procedural safeguards in the capital sentencing 
context.102 Children now have a constitutional right to similar safeguards because in 
Graham, and especially Miller, the Court treated LWOP as tantamount to the death 
penalty for children.103 When the state seeks to impose life without parole upon a juvenile 
homicide defendant, state court judges should ensure that children facing that sentence 
have a right to representation on par with what a capital defendant deserves,104 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
101 Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 411 (“[E]xecution is the most irremediable and unfathomable of 
penalties. . .death is different.”)(citing Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976)).   
102 See infra notes __ -___ and accompanying text. 
103 David Siegel, What Hath Miller Wrought: Effective Representation of Juveniles in Capital-Equivalent 
Proceedings, 39 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 363 (2013).  
104 To be sure, there are many places in the country where courts do not adequately safeguard the rights to 
which capital defendants are entitled. My point here is that, to the extent that the Supreme Court has 
articulated the right of effective representation for capital defendants, that same articulation now applies to 
children facing life without parole.   
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specifically qualified counsel and a team that includes a mitigation specialist and perhaps 
more specific juvenile expertise.105  
a. Procedural Safeguards in the Death Penalty Context 
The Supreme Court first established the constitutional standard for review of 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims in Strickland v. Washington.106 Strickland 
announced a two-pronged test for these claims.107 Clients challenging the efficacy of their 
representation under Strickland are required to show that 1) counsel’s performance was 
deficient and 2) that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.108 In terms of the 
first prong, the Court has identified certain minimum attributes of effective 
representation, such as maintaining conflict-free representation, consulting the client on 
major decisions, keeping the client informed of developments in the case, and bringing to 
bear the skill necessary to subject the outcome of the case to adversarial testing.109 
Beyond these threshold components, though, the Court has been reticent to define the 
contours of defense counsel’s specific obligations under the first prong of Strickland. As 
the Strickland Court explained: “When a convicted defendant complains of the 
ineffectiveness of counsel's assistance, the defendant must show that counsel's 
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. More specific 
guidelines are not appropriate. . . The proper measure of attorney performance remains 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
105 See generally AM. BAR ASS’N, American Bar Association Guidelines for the Appointment and 
Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases (2003), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/2011_build/death_penalty_representation/2003guid
elines.authcheckdam.pdf. 
106 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
107 Id., 466 U.S. 668, 687. 
108 Id., 466 U.S. 668, 687. 
109 Id. at 688. 
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simply reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.”110 Thus, in general, 
effective representation requires minimal pre-determined performance components from 
defense counsel. 
As for the second prong of the Strickland test, the Supreme Court has imposed an 
incredibly high burden – indeed, some have argued insurmountable burden111 – upon 
clients claiming ineffective assistance. As the Strickland Court explained: “the defendant 
must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional 
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is 
a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”112 Moreover, the 
Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that analysis under this prong should be highly 
deferential to defense counsel and the range of judgment calls that counsel are required to 
make.113 With this approach, the Court has rejected Strickland claims where defense 
counsel refused to cooperate in presenting perjured testimony;114 where defense counsel 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
110 Id. at 688. (explaining that ABA Standards may serves as “guides” for determining objectively 
reasonable performance).  
111 See e.g., Stephen F. Smith, Taking Strickland Claims Seriously, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 515, 518-526 
(2009)(explaining the Strickland test and identifying its flaws in application); see also id. at 526 (“‘Courts 
rarely reverse convictions for ineffective assistance of counsel, even if the defendant's lawyer was asleep, 
drunk, unprepared, or unknowledgeable. In short, any ‘lawyer with a pulse will be deemed 
effective.”’)(citation omitted).  
112 Strickland, 466 U.S. 668, 694.  
113 Id. at 689. (“Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential. . . A fair assessment 
of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, 
to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from 
counsel's perspective at the time. Because of the difficulties inherent in making the evaluation, a court must 
indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional 
assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the 
challenged action “might be considered sound trial strategy.”)(citations omitted). See also Lockhart v 
Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 368-371(1993)(explaining that central question in Strickland claims is whether 
counsel’s performance compromised defendant’s right to a fair trial and citing cases to this effect).  
 
114 Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 186-187 (1986)(Blackmun, J., concurring)(“To the extent that 
Whiteside's claim rests on the assertion that he would have been acquitted had he been able to testify 
falsely, Whiteside claims a right the law simply does not recognize.... Since Whiteside was deprived of 
neither a fair trial nor any of the specific constitutional rights designed to guarantee a fair trial, he has 
suffered no prejudice”)(citation omitted). 
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appeared by speakerphone at a plea-hearing;115 where defense counsel advised a quick 
no-contest plea without first filing a motion to suppress one of defendant’s 
confessions;116 and where a trial court prevented the defendant from conferring with 
counsel between direct and cross-examination.117 Lower courts have followed suit, 
applying Strickland in a way that largely insulates defense counsel from ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims.118   
Despite this generally deferential standard for defense counsel, the Court has applied 
the Strickland test with more bite in the capital context. In particular, the Supreme Court 
has emphasized in a series of cases that capital defense counsel have a special obligation 
to gather and present mitigation evidence that may persuade a jury to spare the 
defendant’s life. In Williams v. Taylor,119 defense counsel failed to discover and present 
evidence related to Williams’ commitment at eleven years old; evidence demonstrating 
his early childhood abuse and neglect; and evidence that he was borderline mentally 
retarded and had suffered repeated head injuries.120 The Supreme Court, applying the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
115 Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120 (2008)(finding that lower court’s determination on the issue was not 
an unreasonable application of law and thus denying petitioner’s request for habeas relief). 
116 Premo v. Moore, 131 S.Ct. 733 (2011)(“In determining how searching and exacting their review must 
be, habeas courts must respect their limited role in determining whether there was manifest deficiency in 
light of information then available to counsel.”). Id at. 741. 
117 Perry v. Leeke, 488 U.S. 272 (1989). 
 
118 See e.g., Halverson v. State, 372 N.W.2d 463, 466 (South Dakota 1985)(“Halverson's allegations as to 
ineffective counsel fail. He has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that a different result would 
have occurred if his attorney had been awake at the arraignment and objected when the state's attorney 
made a plea for a longer sentence.”); Moore v. State, 227 S.W.3d 421 (Ct. App. Texas 2007)(rejecting 
Strickland claim on basis of attorney falling asleep during state’s cross-examination of defendant).  
119 529 U.S. 362 (1999). 
120 529 U.S. 362, 370. 
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Strickland test, held that counsel’s representation of Williams had been deficient and that 
the inefficacy prejudiced the outcome of his case.121   
Four years later, the Court again found defense counsel’s performance ineffective 
in the capital case of Wiggins v. Smith.122 There, purportedly for strategic reasons, 
defense counsel failed to put on any evidence regarding the defendant’s childhood, which 
had been marked by neglect, an alcoholic mother, repeated foster home stints, long 
absences from school, and at least one episode of being abandoned for days with no 
food.123 The Court held that counsel did not comport with prevailing standards of 
performance, and in coming to this conclusion, the Court referred both to standard 
practice in Maryland at the time of defendant’s trial and to the ABA Guidelines for the 
Appointment and Performance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases (“the Guidelines”).124 
The Wiggins Court explained: “The ABA Guidelines provide that investigations into 
mitigating evidence ‘should comprise efforts to discover all reasonably available 
mitigating evidence and evidence to rebut any aggravating evidence that may be 
introduced by the prosecutor.’ . . Despite these well-defined norms, however, counsel 
abandoned their investigation of petitioner's background after having acquired only 
rudimentary knowledge of his history from a narrow set of sources.”125  Scholars have 
recognized that the Wiggins Court “promoted a longstanding guideline of the ABA--that 
capital counsel thoroughly explore the social background of the defendant--to the level of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
121 529 U.S. 362, 399.  
122 539 U.S. 510 (2003). 
123 539 U.S. 510, 525. 
124 539 U.S. 510, 524-525. 
125 Id. at 524. (citations omitted). 
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constitutional mandate.”126 And in the wake of Wiggins, the Supreme Court has 
continued to emphasize the importance of mitigation evidence in capital trials.127 
In addition to the emphasis upon mitigation, there are two other aspects to capital 
defense that are relevant to children facing LWOP and lawyers representing them.  First, 
capital defense counsel must be attune to the question whether their client is mentally 
retarded and thus ineligible for the death penalty under Atkins v. Virginia.128 The Atkins 
Court employed clinical definitions of mental retardation and noted that they “require not 
only subaverage intellectual functioning, but also significant limitations in adaptive skills 
such as communication, self-care, and self-direction that became manifest before age 
18.”129 In the wake of the Atkins decision, states have developed their own definitions of 
mental retardation for Atkins purposes,130 and defense counsel has an obligation to 
explore whether the defendant’s social history presents a possible Atkins claim. If so, 
special, non-legal expertise will be required.131  
Finally, in capital cases, “when the defendant’s mental condition is seriously in 
question,” the defendant has a constitutional right to expert psychiatric assistance at the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
126 See The Supreme Court Term, 2002 Term: Leading Cases, 278 Harv. L. Rev. 282 (2003); see also Cara 
H. Drinan, The Revitalization of Ake: A Capital Defendant’s Right to Expert Assistance, 60 OKLA. L. REV. 
283, 298-300(2007)(discussing interplay of Wiggins and Ake). 
127 See, e.g., Porter v. McCollum 558 U.S. 30 (2009)(defense counsel's failure to uncover and present 
mitigation evidence regarding defendant's mental health, family background, and military service was 
deficient). 
 
128 536 U.S. 304 (2002)(holding that execution of the mentally retarded is cruel and unusual punishment).  
129 536 U.S. 304, 318. See also John H. Blume, Sheri Lynn Johnson, and Christopher Seeds, Of Atkins and 
Men: Deviations from Clinical Definitions of Mental Retardation in Death Penalty Cases, 18 CORNELL J.L. 
& PUB. POL'Y 689, 694-697 (2009)(describing the clinical definitions and the Atkins framework).   
 
130 Id. (highlighting the flaws in many of these definitions). 
131 Nancy Haydt, Intellectual Disability: A Digest of Complex Concepts in Atkins Proceedings, 38-FEB 
Champion 44 (2014)(arguing that too many ill-qualified individuals are permitted to testify as so-called 
Atkins experts and identifying skills and training that mental health professionals must have for Atkins 
expert status). Id. at 45.(“Because intellectual disability is a clinical diagnosis, Atkins proceedings require 
expert testimony.”) 
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state’s expense if necessary.132 In Ake v. Oklahoma, the Supreme Court recognized that, 
when the state relies upon expert testimony to secure a death sentence, the defendant 
must have an adequate opportunity to rebut that expert testimony.133 In Ake’s case, 
defense counsel requested funding to secure a psychiatric determination of his sanity at 
the time of the crime.134 The trial court denied the funds, and the state not only convicted 
Ake, but also used psychiatric expertise to prove at sentencing that he posed a future 
danger to society.135 The jury sentenced Ake to death. The Ake Court held that this denial 
of expert assistance worked a fundamental unfairness in Ake’s trial and that the due 
process clause requires state-funded expert assistance on such facts.136 Since the Ake 
decision, indigent defendants have argued for and obtained state-funded experts to testify 
on a wide range of psychiatric issues.137  
Thus, in capital cases, the Supreme Court has imposed enhanced procedural 
safeguards to ensure the fairness of the trial and its outcome. As discussed above, the 
Strickland test applies with its greatest force in the capital context; the Atkins decision 
imposes upon capital defense counsel a heightened duty to explore clients’ intellectual 
disabilities; and the Ake decision requires states to fund psychiatric experts when 
necessary in capital trials. Because the Supreme Court has treated LWOP for children as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
132 Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 82 (1985).  
133 470 U.S. 68, 82. 
 
134 470 U.S. 68, 72.  
135 470 U.S. 68, 72-73. 
136 470 U.S. 68, 80-83. 
137 Cara H. Drinan, The Revitalization of Ake: A Capital Defendant’s Right to Expert Assistance, 60 OKLA. 
L. REV. 283, 287-288 (describing the expansion of the Ake entitlement outside capital context and outside 
psychiatric context). 
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tantamount to the death penalty, as I turn to discussing below, these procedural 
safeguards now apply to children facing LWOP.    
b. The Miller Court Treated LWOP Like a Death Sentence for Kids 
The Graham and Miller Courts suggested that LWOP for children is tantamount 
to the death penalty. To begin, the Graham Court employed its categorical approach in 
assessing Graham’s proportionality challenge – an approach it had previously reserved 
for capital cases.138 In assessing Graham’s challenge, the Court noted that LWOP 
sentences “share some characteristics with death sentences” in that “[t]he State does not 
execute the offender sentenced to life without parole, but the sentence alters the 
offender's life by a forfeiture that is irrevocable.”139 Further, the Graham Court 
recognized that LWOP as applied to children is especially harsh: “Under this sentence a 
juvenile offender will on average serve more years and a greater percentage of his life in 
prison than an adult offender. A 16–year–old and a 75–year–old each sentenced to life 
without parole receive the same punishment in name only.”140  
The Miller Court further developed this concept that LWOP for children is akin to 
the death penalty. Citing Woodson v. North Carolina,141 the Miller Court recognized that, 
in capital cases, the Court “has required sentencing authorities to consider the 
characteristics of a defendant and the details of his offense before sentencing him to 
death.”142 The Court then noted that, because “Graham. . .likened life without parole for 
juveniles to the death penalty itself,” the same individualized sentencing requirement 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
138 560 U.S. 48, 60-62. 
139 560 U.S. 48, 69. 
140 560 U.S. 48, 70. 
141 428 U.S. 280 (1976).  
142 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2464.  
Spring	  2015	  
Do	  Not	  Cite	  Without	  Author’s	  Permission	  
	   32	  
must pertain when a juvenile faces an LWOP sentence.143 Finally, in exposing the 
constitutional infirmity of mandatory LWOP schemes, the Miller Court explained that 
youth itself is “more than a chronological fact” and may be the most powerful mitigating 
factor available to a defendant.144 
 The Court has now joined these two lines of precedent – the line elevating 
mitigation to a constitutional requirement for capital defendants and the line treating 
LWOP as tantamount to a death sentence for children. Accordingly, state court judges 
should ensure that, just as in capital cases, juveniles facing LWOP receive representation 
on par with best practices for death penalty representation. In other words, the same 
enhanced procedural safeguards required for capital cases, now apply to cases where 
children face LWOP. 
c. Wiggins/Atkins/Ake for Kids 
What exactly should enhanced procedural safeguards for children facing LWOP 
look like? The ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Defense 
Counsel in Death Penalty Cases (“The Guidelines”) provide a good starting point, as the 
Court itself has incorporated the Guidelines into its Sixth Amendment efficacy 
analysis.145 To begin, the Guidelines state that defense counsel in capital cases must have 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
143 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2464. 
144 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2468 (“Mandatory life without parole for a juvenile precludes consideration of his 
chronological age and its hallmark features—among them, immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to 
appreciate risks and consequences. It prevents taking into account the family and home environment that 
surrounds him—and from which he cannot usually extricate himself—no matter how brutal or 
dysfunctional. It neglects the circumstances of the homicide offense, including the extent of his 
participation in the conduct and the way familial and peer pressures may have affected him. Indeed, it 
ignores that he might have been charged and convicted of a lesser offense if not for incompetencies 
associated with youth—for example, his inability to deal with police officers or prosecutors (including on a 
plea agreement) or his incapacity to assist his own attorneys. . . And finally, this mandatory punishment 
disregards the possibility of rehabilitation even when the circumstances most suggest it.”). 
145 See AM. BAR ASS’N, American Bar Association Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of 
Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases (2003), available at 
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sufficient training and expertise in capital representation.146 In addition, the Guidelines 
highlight the importance of mitigation evidence in their requirements that defense 
counsel have sufficient skill in investigating and presenting mitigation evidence, as well 
as experience working with expert witnesses, especially mental health experts.147 The 
Guidelines recognize that, given the complexity of capital cases, even qualified defense 
counsel cannot work alone. The Guidelines describe a “Defense Team,” which includes 
lead counsel and at least one associate counsel.148 Lead counsel is then further advised to 
retain as additional members of the Team: “at least one mitigation specialist and one fact 
investigator; at least one member qualified by training and experience to screen 
individuals for the presence of mental or psychological disorders or impairments; and any 
other members needed to provide high quality legal representation.”149 Finally, the 
Commentary to the Guidelines makes clear that the Team described in the Standard is a 
minimum, and that lead counsel is responsible for ensuring that, if additional skill and 
expertise are required, other members will be added to the team (or if funds are not 
available, the issue is at least preserved for appeal).150 In sum, the ABA Guidelines for 
capital representation set forth a standard for high-quality legal representation in the 
death penalty setting, which includes a team of relevant specialists working to buttress 
the legal skills of qualified counsel.    
 Because the Supreme Court has treated LWOP for kids as analogous to a death 
sentence for adults, then it follows that juveniles facing LWOP should enjoy protections 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/2011_build/death_penalty_representation/2003guid
elines.authcheckdam.pdf.  
146 Guideline 5.1 and 8.1.  
147 Guideline 5.1. 
148 Guideline 10.4(A).  
149 Guideline 10.4(C).  
150 Guidelines 10.4 Commentary. 
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analogous to those set forth in the ABA Guidelines for capital representation. This 
imposes several obligations upon states trying juveniles for a crime that carries a possible 
LWOP sentence.  
First, just as the Guidelines require that defense counsel in capital cases have 
sufficient training and expertise in capital representation,151 so, too, should juveniles 
facing an LWOP sentence have counsel experienced in the representation of juveniles 
facing adult sentences in adult court.152 The National Juvenile Defender Center has 
promulgated standards that address in great detail the obligations of counsel representing 
juveniles from initial client contact, through the pre-trial process, at adjudicatory hearings 
and when the client faces the risk of adult prosecution.153  For a juvenile facing a murder 
charge in adult court and an LWOP sentence, Standard 8.1 is most relevant. The 
Standards says that “[s]pecialized training and experience are prerequisites to providing 
effective assistance of counsel to youth facing adult prosecution.”154 This is because the 
lawyer must be familiar with the process by which the juvenile defendant will be 
transferred out of juvenile court; the presumption in favor of or against keeping the 
defendant in juvenile court; and adult criminal court rules all at once.155  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
151 Guideline 5.1 and 8.1.  
152 Expertise in juvenile representation is required whenever a child faces detention. For example, even in a 
discretionary transfer hearing, the lawyer must have experience with and ability to explain juvenile 
rehabilitation to a judge. See generally Thomas F. Geraghty and Will Rhee, Learning from Tragedy, 
Representing Children in Discretionary Transfer Hearings, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 595, 595 (1998). 
Because a child would only face an LWOP sentence in adult court, I am not addressing the issues of 
representation in juvenile delinquency proceedings, an issue fraught with its own challenges. See generally 
Kristin Henning, Loyalty, Paternalism and Rights: Client Counseling Theory and the Role of Child’s 
Counsel in Delinquency Cases, 81 Notre Dame L. Rev. 245 (2005). 
153 See generally, National Juvenile Defender Center, National Juvenile Defense Standards, 2012, herein 
after “Juvenile Defense Standards,” available at: 
http://www.njdc.info/pdf/NationalJuvenileDefenseStandards2013.pdf.  
154 Juvenile Defense Standard 8.1. 
155 Juvenile Defense Standard 8.1.(a).  
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In addition, counsel must have specialized training in child and adolescent 
development so that she can educate the court as to how youth alone places a defendant at 
a significant disadvantage in the criminal justice process. For example, the Supreme 
Court has acknowledge what “any parent knows:”156 that children are less mature and 
less responsible than adults; that children do not have the same capacity to appreciate the 
long-term consequences of decisions; and that children may be overwhelmed by 
potentially coercive environments, even when a reasonable adult would not be.157 
Competent counsel for a juvenile facing LWOP must be able to explain her client’s 
developmental issues and the impact they have on her client’s competency to stand trial, 
to assist with their own defense and to endure adult protocols and facilities.158 
Related, counsel for the juvenile defendant facing LWOP must be able to 
communicate with her client in a developmentally appropriate way regarding a number of 
key issues.159 Counsel must be able to discuss with her client the transfer process and all 
of its components, including factors relevant to the transfer decision, whether to 
participate in diagnostic programs that may inform the transfer decision, and the severe 
consequences that can attach if the defendant is tried as an adult.160 Counsel should also 
be capable of discussing sentencing possibilities in an appropriate way. Many juveniles 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
156 Roper, 543 U.S. at 569.   
157 J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S.Ct. 2394, 2403.  
 
158 Juvenile Defense Standard 8.1.b, c, d; see also Standard 8.6 (“Upon determination that the client will be 
prosecuted in adult court, counsel must zealously oppose placement of the client in adult jail or detention. 
Counsel must be aware of and raise the risks associated with incarcerating young people among adults, and 
be able to propose alternative placements in the juvenile justice system and/or release of the client on 
bail.”).   
 
159 Juvenile Defense Standard 8.2 (“Counsel must use developmentally appropriate language to fully advise 
the client of the procedures that may lead to adult prosecution and the various ways that the state could 
proceed.”). 
 
160 Juvenile Defense Standard 8.2, Commentary.  
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serving extreme custodial sentences have reported that they simply did not appreciate the 
meaning of a lengthy sentence – either they did not think they would actually serve such 
a long time or they simply could not grasp what such a sentence would entail.161 
Competent counsel will have the specialized training and experience to communicate 
with and represent a juvenile facing an LWOP sentence.  
Second, just as the Supreme Court made clear in Wiggins that mitigation is a 
central component to capital representation, that same emphasis upon mitigation should 
apply to the representation of juveniles facing LWOP. In fact, the sentencing phase of a 
capital trial entails an inquiry comparable to that described by the Miller Court for 
children facing LWOP. The Eighth Amendment requires that the sentencer in a capital 
case be able to consider all relevant mitigation evidence: “A jury must be allowed to 
consider on the basis of all relevant evidence not only why a death sentence should be 
imposed, but also why it should not be imposed.”162 Similarly, the Miller Court 
condemned mandatory imposition of LWOP on children: “Such mandatory penalties, by 
their nature, preclude a sentencer from taking account of an offender's age and the wealth 
of characteristics and circumstances attendant to it. Under these schemes, every juvenile 
will receive the same sentence as every other—the 17–year–old and the 14–year–old, the 
shooter and the accomplice, the child from a stable household and the child from a 
chaotic and abusive one.”163 According to Miller, before imposing LWOP on a juvenile, a 
sentencing body must consider: the aspects of youth itself that may explain the criminal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
161 Amnesty International & Human Rights Watch, The Rest of their Lives: Life Without Parole for Child 
Offenders in the United States, Part VI , The Reality of the Sentence (2005)(citing examples of juvenile 
defendants who simply did not grasp what a life sentence would entail), available at: 
http://www.hrw.org/node/11578/section/7.   
162 Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 271 (1976). 
163 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2467-2468. 
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act, the defendant’s reduced culpability, and the defendant’s compromised ability to 
participate in his own defense;164 the defendant’s family and home environment;165 and 
the circumstances of the homicide offense, including the extent to which accomplices and 
external influences were involved.166 This inquiry into relevant mitigation, as described 
by the Miller Court, mirrors the mitigation inquiry of capital trial’s sentencing phase.  
And in order to gather and prepare that mitigation evidence, counsel for a juvenile 
defendant facing LWOP will need team members comparable to those contemplated by 
the ABA Guidelines for death penalty cases.167  At a minimum, this means that the team 
should include a mitigation specialist and some member who is trained to screen for 
mental health issues.168 A mitigation specialist is tasked with an enormous job. She is 
responsible for conducting a comprehensive investigation of the defendant’s life history, 
including family and educational background, biological issues, psychological issues and 
social environment.169 In order to compile this history, the mitigation specialist typically 
needs to conduct repeated, extensive interviews with the defendant and the defendant’s 
family members,170 as well as other individuals who can illuminate the defendant’s life, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
164 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2468 (“Mandatory life without parole for a juvenile precludes consideration of his 
chronological age and its hallmark features—among them, immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to 
appreciate risks and consequences.”); see also Id. at 2468 (“[Mandatory LWOP] it ignores that he might 
have been charged and convicted of a lesser offense if not for incompetencies associated with youth—for 
example, his inability to deal with police officers or prosecutors (including on a plea agreement) or his 
incapacity to assist his own attorneys.”)(citations omitted).  
165 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2468 ([Mandatory LWOP] prevents taking into account the family and home 
environment that surrounds him—and from which he cannot usually extricate himself—no matter how 
brutal or dysfunctional.”). 
166 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2468 (“[Mandatory LWOP] neglects the circumstances of the homicide offense, 
including the extent of his participation in the conduct and the way familial and peer pressures may have 
affected him.”). 
167 See supra notes __-__ and accompanying text. 
168 Guideline10.4(C). 
169 Daniel L. Payne, Building a Case for Life: A Mitigation Specialist as a Necessity and as a Matter of 
Right, 16 CAP. DEF. J. 43, 45 (2003).  
170 Interviewing the defendant’s family members can be especially complex and time-consuming. See 
Daniel L. Payne, Building a Case for Life: A Mitigation Specialist as a Necessity and a Matter of Right, 16 
CAP. DEF. J. 43, 46 (The family will likely have firsthand knowledge of many of the events in the 
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such as friends, doctors, teachers and employers.171 The mitigation specialist will also 
need to do an exhaust review of all relevant documents and records in the defendant’s life 
history, such as medical records, school records, and behavioral records during periods of 
incarceration.172 These records may reveal that the defendant had intellectual 
impairments from an early age, suggesting a need for further testing; or they may indicate 
that the defendant suffered abuse at an early age that may have shaped his behavior and 
criminal conduct. Only a mitigation specialist can properly conduct this time intensive 
inquiry,173 and it may generate evidence that is lifesaving for the capital defendant or 
juvenile defendant facing LWOP.  
Just as the Guidelines state that death penalty counsel should retain “any other 
members needed to provide high quality legal representation,”174 so this is true in juvenile 
LWOP cases. Because of the unique characteristics of youth, this may require defense 
counsel to retain an expert who can testify to those features of youth that render a 
juvenile defendant less culpable and more amenable to rehabilitation. In the same way 
that Atkins experts have emerged to educate courts regarding mentally retarded capital 
defendants, there may be a need for “Miller experts” to educate courts regarding youthful 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
defendant's life and can detail many of the most traumatic experiences of the defendant's childhood. 
Unfortunately, this group often can be the least likely to give a complete and accurate description of a 
defendant's life because they do not want to believe that their own shortcomings in raising and relating to 
the defendant were in any way responsible for his criminal activity. Multiple visitations are often required 
to convince these people that the mitigation evidence that they can offer will not shift the blame to them, 
but rather offer an explanation of the circumstances that led to the crime that may be useful in saving the 
defendant's life.”)(citations omitted).  
171 Id. at 47. 
172 Id. at 47. 
173 Id. at 48-49. (“Because only an individual with education and experience in social work is qualified to 
make a thorough and complete investigation into a defendant's biosocial and psychosocial history, a 
mitigation specialist is the only individual who can sufficiently complete this type of investigation in a 
capital case. Furthermore, the need for a detailed investigation into a defendant's records and repeated 
interviews with those who have contact with the defendant effectively precludes any other member of the 
defense team from being able to complete the mitigation investigation.”)(citations omitted). Id at 49. 
174 Guidelines 10.4 Commentary. 
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defendants facing LWOP. A so-called Miller expert could address a wide range of issues 
related to youthful defendants and their involvement in the criminal justice system. For 
example, a Miller expert could testify to the following mitigating facts: that youth are 
biologically less culpable than adult defendants;175 that youth are more likely to commit 
crimes out of peer pressure and circumstantial factors than adults;176 that the majority of 
youthful offenders will outgrow their unlawful behavior;177 and that incarceration in adult 
prison not only does not rehabilitate youth but actually has a criminogenic effect on 
them.178 Finally, under Ake, counsel representing a juvenile facing LWOP should argue, 
if necessary, that state funds are required to compensate a mitigation specialist or a Miller 
expert because only with such expertise can the defendant have a fair trial consistent with 
the Miller Court directives.  
The Miller Court joined two lines of precedent: the line of cases elevating 
mitigation to a constitutional requirement in capital cases and the line of cases treating 
LWOP for children as comparable to the death penalty for adults. As a result, children 
facing LWOP now have a right to enhanced procedural safeguards on par with what the 
Court has described for capital cases. By ensuring that juveniles facing LWOP have 
representation on par with the ABA’s Guidelines for capital cases, state court judges can 
guarantee that juveniles facing LWOP receive an individualized sentence as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
175 See generally Beatriz Luna, The Relevance of Immaturities in the Juvenile Brain to Culpability and 
Rehabilitation, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 1469 (2012).  
176 Elizabeth S. Scott and Laurence Steinberg, Blaming Youth, 81 TEX. L. REV. 799 , 830 (2003)(“[Y]ouths 
are likely to act more impulsively and to weigh the consequences of their options differently from adults, 
discounting risks and future consequences, and over-valuing (by adult standards) peer approval, immediate 
consequences, and the excitement of risk taking.”). 
177 Id. at 834 (“Most youths will outgrow their inclination to get involved in crime and mature into persons 
who do not reject the law's values.”).  
178 Robert E. Pierre, Adult System Worsens Juvenile Recidivism, Report Says, THE WASHINGTON POST, 
Nov. 30, 2007.  
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contemplated by the Miller Court and that the LWOP sentence is imposed only in the 
most extreme cases.179 These procedural safeguards would go a long way toward 
implementing the vision of the Miller Court. 
2. Miller Signals the End to Juvenile Mandatory Minimums 
Since the Miller decision, states’ responses – both legislative and judicial – have 
run the gamut. Some states have responded in salutary ways, enacting reforms that 
address not just the immediate requirements of Miller but also the animating principles of 
the decision. On the other end of the spectrum, other states have enacted legislation that 
may comply with a hyper-technical reading of Miller but that eviscerate its larger 
message regarding the diminished culpability of children. In this section of Part III, I 
survey the spectrum of responses to the question of what sentences are permissible post-
Miller. Having done so, I argue that Miller should be read to preclude mandatory 
minimums for juveniles, and thus legislation that simply replaces juvenile LWOP with 
alternative mandatory sentences, especially steep ones, violates Miller.  
a. The Spectrum of State Responses 
In the last three years, states have responded to Miller in a wide variety of ways. 
While Miller presented many issues of implementation for lower courts and 
legislatures,180 in this paper I am particularly interested in how states have answered the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
179 Cf. 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2469 (“Because that holding is sufficient to decide these cases, we do not consider 
Jackson's and Miller's alternative argument that the Eighth Amendment requires a categorical bar on life 
without parole for juveniles, or at least for those 14 and younger. But given all we have said in Roper, 
Graham, and this decision about children's diminished culpability and heightened capacity for change, we 
think appropriate occasions for sentencing juveniles to this harshest possible penalty will be uncommon.”).  
180 Two issues have been particularly vexing for actors implementing Miller. First, the Supreme Court has 
yet to resolve whether Miller applies retroactively and that has generated a judicial split and uneven 
application of federal law. See supra note 77.  Second, courts have grappled with whether Miller also 
sweeps more broadly than life without parole sentences and addresses mandatory life sentences and 
mandatory term-of-years sentences that are tantamount to life sentences. Cf. Goins v. Smith, 556 Fed. 
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following question: if Miller holds that juveniles convicted of homicide may not be 
sentenced to mandatory LWOP, what sentence is permissible for a juvenile homicide 
defendant?  
Some states have heeded the call of the Miller Court and have comprehensively 
reconsidered LWOP and extreme custodial sentences as they apply to children. To begin, 
six states have abolished LWOP for juveniles.181 Moreover, West Virginia and Delaware 
have enacted legislation that abolished juvenile LWOP and provides for ongoing, 
periodic review of children serving lengthy custodial sentences.182 Under West Virginia’s 
new law, a juvenile convicted of an offense that would otherwise permit an LWOP 
sentence is eligible for parole review after serving fifteen years. At the same time, the 
West Virginia law requires the sentencing court to consider a comprehensive list of 
mitigating factors, drawn from the Miller Court’s language, before imposing any 
sentence on a juvenile transferred to adult criminal court.183 Similarly, Delaware’s new 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Appx. 434 (2014)(Sixth Cir. 2014)(affirming juvenile defendant’s 84-year sentence post-Graham and 
Miller). 
181 See generally The Sentencing Project, Slow to Act: State Responses to 2012 Supreme Court Mandate on 
Life Without Parole, June 2014 (listing Hawaii, Massachusetts, Texas, West Virginia, and Wyoming as 
states that have abolished juvenile LWOP post-Miller)(hereinafter “Slow to Act”), available at: 
http://sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/jj_State_Responses_to_Miller.pdf; see also Campaign for the 
Fair Sentencing of Youth, Infographic: Reforms Since Miller: Two Year Snapshot (identifying the same 
states plus Delaware as states that have abolished juvenile LWOP post-Miller), available at: 
http://fairsentencingofyouth.org/what-is-jlwop/.  
182 See West Virginia H.B. 4210, available at: 
http://www.legis.state.wv.us/Bill_Status/bills_text.cfm?billdoc=HB4210%20SUB%20ENR.htm&yr=2014
&sesstype=RS&i=4210; see Delaware S.B. 9.  
183 West Virginia H.B. 4210 §61-11-23 (c)(1-15)(lsiting the following fifteen factors: 1) Age at the time of 
the offense; 2) Impetuosity; 3) Family and community environment; 4) Ability to appreciate the risks and 
consequences of the conduct; 5) Intellectual capacity; 6) The outcomes of a comprehensive mental health 
evaluation conducted by an mental health professional licensed to treat adolescents in the State of West 
Virginia. . . ; 7) Peer or familial pressure; 8) Level of participation in the offense; 9) Ability to participate 
meaningfully in his or her defense; 10) Capacity for rehabilitation; 11) School records and special 
education evaluations; 12) Trauma history; 13) Faith and community involvement; 14) Involvement in the 
child welfare system; and 15) Any other mitigating factor or circumstances). The new legislation similarly 
sets forth factors that the parole board should take into account when periodically assessing the parole 
eligibility of juveniles. See §62-12-13b(b)(requiring the parole board to consider “the diminished 
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law precludes LWOP for juveniles and instructs the sentencing judge to exercise 
discretion when imposing a juvenile homicide sentence in light of the mitigating aspects 
of youth addressed in Miller.184 The new legislation also applies retroactively, thereby 
entitling Delaware inmates currently serving an LWOP sentence for a juvenile crime to a 
resentencing hearing.185 Some state supreme courts have read Miller broadly, too. The 
Massachusetts high court held that Miller applies retroactively and precludes juvenile 
LWOP under any circumstance,186 and the Iowa state Supreme Court held that Miller 
precludes mandatory minimums for juveniles altogether.187 These legislative and judicial 
responses reflect a holistic interpretation of the Miller decision and its motivating 
rationales.  
On the other end of the spectrum, some states have missed the mark by replacing 
mandatory juvenile LWOP with another mandatory juvenile sentence, and, in some cases, 
still leaving juveniles exposed to an LWOP sentence.188 For example, two states have 
enacted post-Miller legislation that replaces mandatory LWOP with a mandatory 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
culpability of juveniles as compared to that of adults, the hallmark features of youth, and any subsequent 
growth and increased maturity of the prisoner during incarceration” and requiring the board to consider 
“educational and court documents. . .Participation in available rehabilitative and educational programs 
while in prison. .  Age at the time of the offense. . .Immaturity at the time of the offense. . .Home and 
community environment at the time of the offense; Efforts made toward rehabilitation. . .evidence of 
remorse; and Any other factors or circumstances the board considers relevant”).  
184 http://legis.delaware.gov/LIS/lis147.nsf/vwLegislation/SB+9/$file/legis.html?open; see also 
http://fairsentencingofyouth.org/2013/06/10/delaware-entacts-sentence-review-process-for-youth/  
185 Equal Justice Initiative, Delaware Eliminates Death in Prison Sentences for Children, June 13, 2013, 
available at: http://www.eji.org/node/779.  
186 Diatchenko v. Dist. Atty. for Suffolk Dist., 466 Mass. 655 (Mass. 2013)(holding that Miller applies 
retroactively and that Massachusetts state constitution forbids LWOP sentence for juveniles). 
187 State v. Lyle, 854 N.W.2d 378, 400 (Iowa 2014)(interpreting Iowa state constitution to prohibit “all 
mandatory minimum sentences of imprisonment for youthful offenders”); see also infra notes __-__ and 
accompanying text.  
188 See generally The Sentencing Project, Slow to Act: State Responses to 2012 Supreme Court Mandate on 
Life Without Parole, June 2014 (documenting states’ responses to Miller decision)(hereinafter “Slow to 
Act”), available at: http://sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/jj_State_Responses_to_Miller.pdf.  
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minimum of forty years for juveniles convicted of homicide.189 Other states have 
imposed similarly steep mandatory minimums and still permit juvenile LWOP. For 
example, Pennsylvania's new legislation permits an LWOP sentence and simply adds less 
punitive alternatives for juveniles convicted of first and second-degree murder.190 Under 
the new law, a Pennsylvania juvenile convicted of first-degree murder may be sentenced 
either to LWOP or a minimum of thirty-five years to life if the defendant is between 
fifteen and seventeen.191 Similarly, Louisiana's revised law requires juveniles convicted 
of murder to serve a mandatory minimum of thirty-five years before parole eligibility, 
and it too permits juvenile LWOP.192 Of the thirteen states that have passed legislation in 
response to Miller, nine still permit juvenile LWOP, and none set an alternative minimum 
sentence at less than twenty-five years.193 While some response is better than none,194 
state legislation that replaces mandatory juvenile LWOP with an alternative, steep 
sentence and that fails to account for the mitigating qualities of youth at sentencing does 
not do justice to the Miller decision.  As I argue in the next sub-section, Miller precludes 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
189 Slow to Act at 2 (citing Nebraska and Texas legislation that requires a minimum of forty years for 
juveniles convicted of homicide).  
190 Juv. L. Ctr., Juvenile Life Without Parole (JLWOP) in Pennsylvania, available at: 
http://www.jlc.orgcurrent-initiatives/promoting-fairness-courts/juvenile-life-without-parole/jlwop-
pennsylvania  (last updated Mar. 26, 2013); S.B. 850, 2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2012), available at http:// 
www.legis.state.pa.us/WU01/LI/LI/US/HTM/2012/0/0204..HTM.  
191 http://www.legis.state.pa.us/WU01/LI/LI/US/HTM/2012/0/0204; HTMS.B. 850 §2 (Pa. 2012). 
192 H.B. 152, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2013), available at http:// 
www.legis.la.gov/legis/BillInfo.aspx?i=222016. The same terms also apply under Florida’s post-Miller 
legislation. See Slow to Act at 2.  
193 Slow to Act at 2.  
194 Twenty-eight states had mandatory LWOP sentences for juveniles convicted of homicide when Miller 
was decided in 2012. Miller, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2471. Fifteen states have yet to respond with legislation to 
address the Miller ruling. Slow to Act at 2. This does not mean that all fifteen states continue to violate 
Miller. For example, in Massachusetts, there has been no legislative response, Id., but because the state 
Supreme Court has abolished juvenile life without parole, see supra note 186 and accompanying text, one 
is not required.  
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mandatory minimums for juveniles, and state actors should bear that in mind when 
crafting a response to Miller.195 
b. Miller Precludes Mandatory Minimums for Juveniles 
While mandatory minimum sentences have been unsuccessfully challenged on 
various constitutional grounds in the past,196 today Miller has breathed new life into such 
challenges as they apply to juveniles. In fact, even before Graham and Miller, post-
Roper, Professor Feld argued that: “The reduced criminal responsibility of adolescents is 
equally diminished when states sentence juveniles to Life Without Parole (LWOP) and 
the functional equivalents of ‘virtual life.’ Although the Supreme Court's capital 
punishment jurisprudence insists that ‘death is different,’ no principled bases exist by 
which to distinguish the diminished responsibility that bars the death penalty from 
adolescents equally reduced culpability that warrants shorter sentences for all serious 
crimes.”197 After the Graham Court barred LWOP for non-homicide juvenile defendants, 
Professor Guggenheim argued in a comprehensive article that Graham rendered 
unconstitutional mandatory minimums for juveniles.198 As he explained, “A state 
sentencing statute that requires, regardless of the defendant's age, that a certain sentence 
be imposed based on the conviction violates a juvenile's substantive right to be sentenced 
based on the juvenile's culpability. When the only inquiry made by the sentencing court is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
195 Even in jurisdictions where the state legislature has enacted post-Miller sentencing protocols, executive 
and judicial actors can challenge the constitutionality of such laws on a facial and as-applied basis. 
Moreover, fifteen states have yet to respond and still have the opportunity to craft legislation that is devoid 
of mandatory minimums for children.  
196 Alex Dutton, The Next Frontier of Juvenile Sentencing Reform: Enforcing Miller’s Individualized 
Sentencing Requirement Beyond the JLWOP Context, 23 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 173, 178-179 
(“Mandatory minimums have been challenged on separation of powers, due process, and equal protection 
grounds. No matter the legal basis, the clear consensus from the courts is that legislatures control 
sentencing policy.”)(citations omitted). 
197 Barry C. Feld, Unmitigated Punishment: Adolescent Criminal Responsibility and LWOP Sentences, 10 
J. L. & FAM. STUD. 11 (2007). 
198 Martin Guggenheim, Graham v. Florida and a Juvenile’s Right to Age-Appropriate Sentencing, 47 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 457, 490-491 (2012). 
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to consult the legislature's mandatory punishment for the crime, without any further 
inquiry into whether the punishment is appropriate for a juvenile, for no other reason than 
it is appropriate for an adult, the Constitution requires more.”  In a prior Essay, I 
suggested that the Miller decision rendered invalid mandatory sentences for juveniles.199 
Here, I want to further develop that claim with two points.200  
First, one cannot square mandatory sentencing of juveniles with the language of 
the Miller Court. The Miller opinion is replete with discussion of process and the 
importance of discretion for juvenile sentencing. The Court explained: “Such mandatory 
penalties, by their nature, preclude a sentencer from taking account of an offender’s age 
and the wealth of characteristics and circumstances attendant to it.”201  And later: 
“Mandatory life without parole for a juvenile precludes consideration of his 
chronological age and its hallmark features – among them, immaturity, impetuosity, and 
failure to appreciate risks and consequences.”202 To be sure, the Miller Court was 
examining and speaking of LWOP, but in an earlier part of the decision, the majority 
recognized that “none of what [Graham] said about children – about their distinctive (and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
199 Cara H. Drinan, Misconstruing Graham and Miller, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 785, 789, n.26 (2014)(“ The 
claim that Miller rendered invalid any and all mandatory minimums for juveniles is outside the scope of 
this Essay, but I think the Miller opinion supports that position. As noted [above] the Miller Court 
consistently insisted upon the importance of discretion at post-trial sentencing of a juvenile. One has to 
wonder how the discretion described by the Miller Court can exist under a mandatory sentencing scheme of 
any kind.”).  
200 I am aware of only two other authors who have argued post-Miller that the Court’s decision renders 
unconstitutional mandatory minimums for juveniles. See Rachael Frumin Eisenberg, Comment: As Though 
They Are Children: Replacing Mandatory Minimums with Individualized Sentencing Determinations for 
Juveniles in Pennsylvania Criminal Court After Miller v. Alabama, 86 TEMP. L. REV. 215 (2013)(arguing 
that Pennsylvania’s use of adult mandatory minimums for juveniles was unconstitutional post-Miller); Alex 
Dutton, The Next Frontier of Juvenile Sentencing Reform: Enforcing Miller’s Individualized Sentencing 
Requirement Beyond the JLWOP Context, 23 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 173 (2013)(suggesting 
advocates can challenge mandatory non-JLWOP sentences using Miller’s approach and using California’s 
mandatory gang and firearm enhancement laws as examples).  
201 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2467. 
202 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2468.  
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transitory) mental traits and environmental vulnerabilities – is crime specific.”203 This 
language suggests that states cannot comport with Miller by replacing mandatory life 
without parole with another mandatory sentence – let alone a steep one.   
The Miller decision recognizes that nothing about the Court’s children-are-
different jurisprudence is crime-specific; it also recognizes that process matters when 
sentencing children. The Court’s position that “none of what [Graham] said about 
children. . .is crime specific”204 is really no different from the position that none of what 
Roper/Graham/Miller said about children is sentence-specific.  The sentencing process 
and discretion called for by the Miller Court are simply incompatible with a mandatory 
sentencing scheme – whether it is a mandatory sentence of life without parole or a 
mandatory sentence of thirty-five years.  
Second, one cannot square mandatory sentencing for juveniles with the logic of 
the Miller Court. The Miller Court drew on two separate strands of precedent: its cases 
dealing with categorical bans on certain sentencing practices and its line of cases 
prohibiting the mandatory imposition of capital punishment.205 The first line of cases to 
which the Miller Court refers says that “children are constitutionally different from adults 
for purposes of sentencing.”206 And the Miller Court then went on to reiterate what Roper 
and Graham had recognized: that brain and social science confirm children are less 
culpable and more amenable to reform and these differences have to matter at 
sentencing.207 Because the Miller Court cemented this “kids are different approach,” one 
cannot claim post-Miller that such differences are irrelevant outside the context of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
203 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2465.  
204 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2465. 
205 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2463-64. 
206 132 S.Ct. 2455, 2464. 
207 132 S.Ct. 2455, 2464-65. 
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LWOP. Rather, the Miller trilogy leads to the conclusion that kids are fundamentally 
different for purposes of culpability and rehabilitation, and those differences should be 
considered whenever a child faces a custodial sentence.  
Further, the Miller Court drew on its line of cases requiring that capital defendants 
“have an opportunity to advance, and the judge or jury a chance to assess, any mitigating 
factors,”208 especially those dealing with the “mitigating qualities of youth.”209 This line 
of cases requires the states to provide defendants an opportunity to present mitigating 
factors that may impact the sentencer, including youth, substance abuse, a history of 
violence within the family, developmental challenges, or traits that suggest amenability to 
rehabilitation. The Miller Court borrowed from this line of cases to say: kids are different 
and that difference should be illuminated in an individualized, discretionary sentencing 
scheme. Thus, the logic of Miller, in addition to its language, suggests that mandatory 
minimums – schemes that preclude individual consideration of mitigating factors, 
including youth – are incompatible with the Miller trilogy.210  
Critics will argue that there is no limiting principle to this claim – that, if indeed 
juveniles cannot be subject to mandatory sentences, the entire process of sentencing 
juveniles in adult court is undermined, as determinate sentencing schemes are the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
208 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2467. 
209 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2467. 
210 It is also important to consider the question of juvenile mandatory minimums in the context of 
mandatory minimums altogether. Criminal justice reform advocates have argued for years that mandatory 
minimums not only dehumanize the criminal defendant facing them, but also that they place an 
unsustainable burden on our criminal justice system by leading to bloated prison populations. See e.g., 
Mary Price, Mill(er)ing Mandatory Minimums: What Federal Lawmakers Should Take from Miller v. 
Alabama, 78 MO. L. REV. 1147 (2013)(discussing link between mandatory minimums and over-
incarceration and urging that Miller-like emphasis on proportionality can reduce incarceration levels). In 
recent years, as states have faced significant corrections costs and budget shortfalls, lawmakers have looked 
for ways to unravel the impact of mandatory minimums on prison populations. In this climate, the moral 
leadership of the Miller decision may facilitate the elimination of juvenile mandatory minimums, and 
juvenile justice advocates should seize upon the opportunity. 
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national norm.211 To begin, that outcome does not necessarily follow. Prohibiting 
mandatory minimums for juveniles does not preclude their appearance in adult criminal 
court; it may make juvenile sentencing in adult court more time-consuming and resource 
intensive. As the Supreme Court has held before, though, efficiency and fiscal constrains 
must yield to the observance of constitutional rights.212 Further, if it is simply too onerous 
for states to sentence juveniles in adult court without relying upon mandatory sentencing 
schemes, that reality may compel prosecutors and legislators to reconsider when, and 
how frequently, children should be transferred to adult court.  
The Iowa Supreme Court’s recent decision in Iowa v. Lyle illustrates these issues 
well.213  In Lyle, the Iowa Supreme Court became the first in the nation to declare that its 
state constitution barred mandatory minimum sentences for juveniles.214 The defendant in 
the case, seventeen year-old Andre Lyle, Jr., was involved in “inane juvenile schoolyard 
conduct.”215 Lyle and his companion punched the victim outside of their high school and 
took a small bag of marijuana from him, claiming that they had paid five dollars for the 
marijuana bag and it had not been delivered.216  Lyle was charged as an adult in criminal 
court, and the trial judge imposed the mandatory sentence applicable to his case: ten 
years, seven of which Lyle would be required to serve before parole consideration.217 In 
an expansive opinion, documenting the evolution of juvenile justice in this country and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
211 See supra Part I. 
212 See e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)(holding Sixth Amendment right to counsel applies 
to states and thus imposing burden on states to pay for that representation); Brown v. Plata, 131 S.Ct. 1910 
(2011)(affirming finding of Eighth Amendment violation due to prison overcrowding and requiring state to 
either improve conditions at state’s expense or release inmates). 
213 State v. Lyle, 854 N.W.2d 378 (2014). 
214 854 N.W.2d 378, 399 (“ Upon exercise of our independent judgment, as we are required to do under the 
constitutional test, we conclude that the sentencing of juveniles according to statutorily required mandatory 
minimums does not adequately serve the legitimate penological objectives in light of the child's 
categorically diminished culpability.”). 
215 Lyle, 854 N.W.2d 378, 401. 
216 Lyle, 854 N.W.2d 378, 381. 
217 Lyle, 854 N.W.2d 378, 381. 
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the United States Supreme Court’s recent juvenile cases, the Iowa Supreme Court 
rejected the concept of mandatory minimums for children: “Mandatory minimum 
sentences for juveniles are simply too punitive for what we know about juveniles.”218 
Moreover, the Court anchored its decision in its reading of Miller: “Miller is properly 
read to support a new sentencing framework that reconsiders mandatory sentencing for 
all children. Mandatory minimum sentencing results in cruel and unusual punishment due 
to the differences between children and adults. This rationale applies to all crimes, and no 
principled basis exists to cabin the protection only for the most serious crimes.”219 
The dissenting Justices expressed great concern about the administrative burdens 
that will be imposed on district courts in the absence of mandatory minimums for 
juveniles.220 Justice Zager estimated that there are more than 100 Iowan inmates serving a 
mandatory sentence that was imposed upon them as a juvenile.221 Further, Justice Zager 
recognized that “[b]ased on the majority's opinion, all of those juveniles must be 
resentenced and have an individualized sentencing hearing. It will take hundreds, if not 
thousands, of hours to perform this task.”222 Worse still, according to the dissenting 
justices, defendants will have the right to put on expert and other relevant witnesses and 
district courts will be required to take into consideration Miller factors such as juveniles’ 
diminished culpability and their capacity for rehabilitation.223 The dissenting justices 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
218 Lyle, 854 N.W.2d 378, 400. 
219 Lyle, 854 N.W.2d 378, 402. 
220 The dissenting Justices also disagreed fundamentally with the majority’s reading of Miller and the state 
Constitution. See generally 854 N.W.2d 378, 404-420. 
221 854 N.W.2d 378, 419 (Zager, J., dissenting). 
222 Id. 
223 Id. (“And, of course, there will be expert witnesses: social workers, psychologists, psychiatrists, 
substance-abuse counselors, and any number of related social scientists. And, other witnesses: mothers, 
fathers, sisters, and brothers.”); see also id (“After the parade of witnesses ends, the district court must then 
produce for each juvenile offender a detailed, reasoned sentencing decision. District courts must consider 
the ‘juvenile's lack of maturity, underdeveloped sense of responsibility, vulnerability to peer pressure, and 
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expressed fear that “[i]n sum, ‘the trial court must consider all relevant evidence’ of the 
distinctive youthful attributes of the juvenile offender.  . . The possibilities are nearly 
endless.”224 And yet the majority was undeterred by these administrative realities and 
recognized that “individual rights are not just recognized when convenient.”225 
Lyle, then, demonstrates a critical tension around the claim that juveniles ought 
not be subject to mandatory minimums. It is true, as all the Justices in Lyle recognized, 
that precluding mandatory minimums for juveniles increases the administrative burden on 
the judicial system. It is not true, though, that precluding mandatory minimums for 
children bars the executive from prosecuting a juvenile in adult court. Nor is it true that 
precluding mandatory minimums for children bars a judge from sentencing a juvenile to a 
statutorily set minimum term; rather, judges may do so after considering the individual 
juvenile before them.226  In Lyle’s case, according to the majority’s rule, the district court 
judge would have been able to sentence Lyle to ten years in prison for the schoolyard 
fight, so long as she had come to that judgment after considering Lyle’s youth and all of 
its attendant circumstances. It may be the case that exercising that judgment is more time-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
the less fixed nature of the juvenile's character,’ keeping in mind that these are ‘mitigating, not aggravating 
factors’ in the decision to impose a sentence. . .  It does not end there. District courts must recognize 
juveniles' capacity for change and “that most juveniles who engage in criminal activity are not destined to 
become lifelong criminals.’ . . If tempted to impose a harsh sentence on even a particularly deserving 
offender, ‘the district court should recognize that a lengthy prison sentence ... is appropriate, if at all, only 
in rare or uncommon cases.’”)(citations omitted). 
224 Id. at 420. 
225 Id. at 403. (“This process will likely impose administrative and other burdens, but burdens our legal 
system is required to assume. Individual rights are not just recognized when convenient. Our court history 
has been one that stands up to preserve and protect individual rights regardless of the consequences. The 
burden now imposed on our district judges to preserve and protect the prohibition against cruel and unusual 
punishment is part of the price paid by many judges over the years that, in many ways, has helped write the 
proud history Iowans enjoy today.”).  
226 Id. at 403. (“It is important to be mindful that the holding in this case does not prohibit judges from 
sentencing juveniles to prison for the length of time identified by the legislature for the crime committed, 
nor does it prohibit the legislature from imposing a minimum time that youthful offenders must serve in 
prison before being eligible for parole. Article I, section 17 only prohibits the one-size-fits-all mandatory 
sentencing for juveniles.”) 
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consuming for the courts; it may be that a judge would be unlikely to impose such a 
sentence after considering Lyle’s age and other relevant factors. But precluding 
mandatory minimums for children is not tantamount to ending the prosecution of children 
in adult court.  
However, suppose that state court judges in Iowa dread juvenile sentencing 
because of the Miller protocol that the state Supreme Court has now mandated. Or 
suppose that prosecutors do not want to pursue an adult criminal sentence except in rare 
cases because of the burden of justifying such sentences under the Miller factors.  It may 
turn out that precluding juvenile mandatory minimums forces state actors to internalize 
the full costs of prosecuting children as adults. And it may follow that, as a result of 
internalizing those costs, over time, state actors charge juveniles as adults only very 
sparingly. Given what science has revealed about juveniles and their capacity for change, 
and given the Supreme Court’s incorporation of that science, such an outcome seems 
logical. Moreover, such an outcome – the reluctant charging of children in adult court – 
would merely be a return to the juvenile justice model that was founded in this country 
more than a century ago.227 
In this Part of the paper, I have argued that Miller was a revolutionary decision, 
and that it has enabled groundbreaking juvenile justice reforms – in particular procedural 
safeguards for children facing LWOP on par with best practices in capital representation 
and the elimination of mandatory minimums for juveniles. As groundbreaking as these 
measures may sound to those who still recall the juvenile super-predator fear of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
227 See supra Part I.  
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1990’s,228 these two measures are readily defensible under Miller and to some extent they 
are already underway. 
B. The Miller Revolution on the Horizon 
While some reform measures flow directly from Miller and are within the grasp 
of juvenile justice advocates, as I argued above, others are farther away on the horizon 
but still achievable post-Miller. In this sub-section of Part III, I address three areas ripe 
for reform in the wake of Miller: 1) juvenile transfer laws; 2) presumptive sentencing 
guidelines as they apply to children; and 3) juvenile conditions of confinement.  
1. Juvenile Transfer Laws 
Juvenile justice advocates have recognized for years that juvenile transfer laws 
have made it too easy and too common for children to be tried and convicted in adult 
criminal court.229 Past challenges to various transfer laws have been unfruitful.230 But 
today, in the wake of the Miller trilogy, there is newfound traction in the claim that 
mandatory transfer laws violate the Constitution.  
As was addressed in Part II of the paper, Miller and its immediate predecessor 
cases changed the landscape for the treatment of children in the criminal justice system. 
After Miller, it is now possible to challenge automatic transfer laws as impermissible 
“one size fits all” treatment of juveniles. In fact, the Miller Court not only took issue with 
conflating adult and juvenile sentencing generally, but it also criticized mandatory 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
228 Nick Straley, Miller’s Promise: Reevaluating Extreme Criminal Sentences for Children, 89 WASH. L. 
REV. 963, 990-993 (2014)(discussing the juvenile super-predator prediction of the early 1990’s and its 
impact on juvenile justice policy).  
229 See e.g., David O. Brink, Immaturity, Normative Competence, and Juvenile Transfer: How (Not) to 
Punish Minors for Major Crimes, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1555 (2004). 
230 See e.g., The People in the Interest of D.M.L., 254 N.W.2d 457 (South Dakota 1977)(rejecting claim 
that juvenile transfer statute was unconstitutionally vague); Commonwealth v. Cotto, 562 Pa. 32 (Penn. 
2000)(rejecting claim that juvenile transfer statute violated Due Process Clause). 
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transfer provisions explicitly.231 The Miller Court explained that mandatory transfer laws, 
depending upon their operation, can vest prosecutors with too much unbridled discretion; 
can force judges into making extreme sentencing choices; and can jeopardize a child’s 
well-being.232  
The language and logic of the Miller trilogy, then, have further eroded the 
legitimacy of transfer laws – laws that have been under attack for decades now. Scholars 
have seized upon this newfound basis for challenging juvenile transfer laws. Professor 
Hoeffel recently argued that juvenile transfer laws should be reconsidered through the 
lens of capital jurisprudence.233 Noting that transfer and death penalty proceedings have 
much in common in their stakes and in their finality,234 she argues for two developments. 
First, Hoeffel argues that the current transfer laws should be amended to narrow the pool 
of juveniles who are eligible for transfer to adult court in the first place.235 Second, she 
argues that the transfer decision-making process should be done on an individual basis, 
just as capital sentencing proceedings have to be, incorporating all relevant mitigation 
evidence.236 Drawing on the Miller Court’s notion that just as death is different, so too 
are children different, Hoeffel unites the capital and juvenile strands of case law to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
231 See supra notes 92-95 and accompanying text. 
232 Miller, 132. S.Ct. 2455, 2474. 
233 Janet C. Hoeffel, The Jurisprudence of Death and Youth: Now the Twain Should Meet, 46 TEX. TECH L. 
REV. 29 (2013). 
234 46 TEX. TECH L. REV. 29, 30 (“The parallels between the death penalty and juvenile transfer are striking. 
Both involve a decision to expose a person to the most severe set of penalties available to the relevant 
justice system: a death sentence for adults in adult court; a transfer to adult court for youth in juvenile 
court. The decision to send an adult to his death is a decision to end his life; the decision to send a juvenile 
to adult court is a decision to end his childhood. Both decisions signify a life not worth saving, and 
therefore, both decisions are to apply to the ‘worst of the worst.’ As a result of the finality and seriousness 
of their consequences, both processes should require the strictest of procedures for reliable imposition of 
those consequences.”)(citation omitted). 
235 Id. at 39-49 (suggesting several bright-line rules to narrow the pool of juveniles eligible for transfer to 
adult court).  
236 Id. at 49-55.  
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challenge existing transfer laws.237 Other scholars have proposed similar reforms post-
Miller,238 and amending juvenile transfer law is now clearly on the horizon.   
2. Presumptive Sentencing Guidelines for Children 
As explained above, mandatory minimums arguably are now unconstitutional 
under Miller, and one state Supreme Court has already held as much.239  For the same 
reason, juvenile justice advocates should look to challenge presumptive and advisory 
sentencing guidelines if they do not account for youth as a mitigating factor. 
Sentencing guidelines range from mandatory to advisory. If a sentence is truly 
mandatory, it means that once the jury has convicted the defendant of a certain charge, 
the judge has no choice but to impose the sentence prescribed by the legislature for that 
crime.240 A presumptive sentencing guideline, however, suggests a pre-determined 
sentence for a crime, but permits the judge to impose a more lenient alternative sentence 
if the judge determines that there are mitigating circumstances. Typically, the legislature 
determines in advance what mitigating factors might justify a downward departure from 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
237 Id. at 30. (“The Court's recent insistence that ‘if . . . death is different, children are different too’ gives 
weight to the application of Eighth Amendment death penalty jurisprudence to juvenile sentences other 
than death in Graham v. Florida and Miller v. Alabama.”)(citations omitted).  
238 Wendy N. Hess, Kids Can Change, Reforming South Dakota’s Juvenile Transfer Law to Rehabilitate 
Children and Protect Safety, 59 S. D. L. Rev. 312 (2014)(arguing for a return to discretionary, individual 
juvenile transfer post-Miller); Brice Hamack, Go Directly to Jail, Do Not Pass Juvenile Court, Do Not 
Collect Due Process: Why Waiving Juveniles into Adult Court Without a Fitness Hearing is a Denial of 
their Basic Due Process Rights, 14 Wyo. L. Rev. 775 (2014)(relying upon the juveniles are different line of 
cases to argue that transfer without a hearing violates due process rights); Christopher Slobogin, Treating 
Juveniles like Juveniles: Getting Rid of Transfer and Expanded Adult Court Jurisdiction, 46 Tex. Tech L. 
Rev. 103 (2013)(arguing for a juvenile justice system without waiver post-Miller); Rachel Jacobs, Waiving 
Goodbye to Due Process: The Juvenile Waiver System, 19 Cardozo J.L. & Gender 989 (2013)(arguing that 
existing waiver procedures violate Due Process). 
   
239 Supra notes 213-219 and accompanying text. 
240 As discussed in Part II of this Paper, Evan Miller was sentenced to life without parole in Alabama under 
a mandatory sentencing scheme.  
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the presumptive sentence.241 Finally, advisory guidelines are voluntary in that they 
provide a benchmark for the sentencing judge, but the judge may depart from the 
suggested sentence with or without explanation.242   
Post-Miller, juvenile justice advocates should insist that youth itself be a relevant 
mitigating factor when presumptive sentencing guidelines apply. As the Miller Court 
explained, there are many “‘mitigating qualities of youth.’”243 Youth is a “time of 
immaturity, irresponsibility, ‘impetuousness[,] and recklessness,’” and it is a period 
during which  “a person may be most susceptible to influence and to psychological 
damage.”244 Thus, youth alone should at least be permissible grounds for a judge to 
impose a more lenient sentence than what the presumptive guideline suggests. 
But not all presumptive sentencing guidelines include youth as a mitigating factor 
in its own right. For example, Alaska provides presumptive sentencing guidelines for 
felonies, and the statute separately lists aggravating factors and mitigating factors.245 The 
Alaska statute lists twenty separate mitigating factors that may “allow imposition of a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
241 Kim S. Hunt, Advisory Guidelines in the Post-Blakely Era, 2005 WL 2922198, 233-235 (providing 
overview of presumptive sentencing guidelines and the rationales for them); see also Connecticut 
Mandatory Minimum Sentences Briefing, 
http://www.cga.ct.gov/2005/pridata/Studies/Mandatory_Minimum_Senteces_Briefing.htm (providing 
examples of crimes that carry a presumptive minimum versus those that carry a mandatory minimum).  
242 See e.g. Maryland State Commission on Criminal Sentencing Policy, Sentencing Guidelines Overview 
(“The sentencing guidelines are advisory and judges may, at their discretion, impose a sentence outside of 
the guidelines.  If judges choose to depart from the sentencing guidelines, the Code of Maryland 
Regulations (COMAR) 14.22.01.05(A) mandates "The judge shall document on the guidelines worksheet 
the reason or reasons for imposing a sentence outside of the recommended guidelines range."  In practice, 
however, the judiciary has generally neglected to provide an explanation for departure. For example, in 
61% of the fiscal year 2005 cases that resulted in a departure from the guidelines, the reason(s) for 
departure was not provided.”), available at: http://www.msccsp.org/Guidelines/Overview.aspx. See also 
Kim S. Hunt, Advisory Guidelines in the Post-Blakely Era, 2005 WL 2922198. 
243 132 S.Ct. 2455, 2467 (citation omitted).  
244 Id. (citations omitted). 
245 AS § 12.55.155 (c)(listing aggravating factors) and (d)(listing mitigating factors). 
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sentence below the presumptive range.”246 Only one of the twenty mitigating factors 
relates to youth, and it does not recognize youth in its own right as a mitigating variable. 
The statute permits a lesser sentence than the presumptive one if “the conduct of a 
youthful defendant was substantially influenced by another person more mature than the 
defendant.”247 Moreover, as with any of the mitigating variables, the burden is on the 
defendant to prove to the judge by clear and convincing evidence each mitigating 
factor.248 Alaska is not alone in its disregard for youth as a mitigating factor in and of 
itself.249 Because the Supreme Court has elevated youth in its own right to a mitigating 
factor of constitutional significance, states must consider youth at sentencing even in a 
presumptive sentencing context.  
3. Juvenile Conditions of Confinement  
In its recent juvenile sentencing decisions, the Supreme Court has focused on 
what sentence the states may impose rather than the conditions under which juveniles are 
required to serve those sentences. Yet, the Court has repeatedly expressed concern with 
the vulnerability of youth in its recent juvenile Eighth Amendment cases,250 and in other 
constitutional settings, too.251 Juvenile justice advocates should leverage the Court’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
246 AS § 12.55.155 (d).  
247 AS § 12.55.155 (d)(4).  
248 AS § 12.55.155 (f).  
249 See e.g., Indiana Code, Considerations in Imposing Sentence, IC 35-38-1-7.1 (listing twelve mitigating 
circumstances the court may consider, none of which relate to youth); Kansas Presumptive Sentencing 
Guidelines, K.S.A. 21-6815  (c)(1)(listing non exhaustive mitigating factors, none of which include youth); 
but see A.R.S. § 13-701 (listing age of defendant as a mitigating factor); N.C.G.S.A. § 15A-1340.16 (listing 
youth as mitigating factor).  
250 See generally supra Part II.  
251 See e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S.Ct. 2791 (1992)(upholding parental consent provision in 
state abortion law, among others, on grounds of juvenile immaturity and lack of judgment); J.D.B. v. North 
Carolina, 131 S.Ct. 2394 (holding that juvenile defendant’s age informs Miranda analysis because children 
are less mature and responsible); Safford Unified School Dist. v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364 (2009)(finding 
unconstitutional school strip search of child in part because of adolescent vulnerability). 
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emphasis upon the vulnerability and susceptibility of youth to seek improved conditions 
of confinement for youth in the years to come. Arguably, there are countless defects with 
American modes of incarceration, many of which are especially problematic for 
juveniles. Here I want to suggest two areas that are ripe for reform post-Miller: juvenile 
incarceration with adults and juvenile solitary confinement – both of which should be 
abolished.  
Each year, approximately 250,000 youth are tried in the adult criminal justice 
system,252 and on any given day 100,000 juveniles are incarcerated.253  Since the 1980’s 
juveniles increasingly have been housed with adult inmates in prisons and jails.254 
Between 1983 and 1998, the number of juveniles in adult jails grew by more than 300%, 
and in approximately the same time period, the number of juveniles admitted to state 
prisons more than doubled.255 Today there are approximately 10,000 juveniles in adult 
prisons and jails on a daily basis.256 
Housing youth with adults persists despite the well-documented, tragic realities of 
the practice. To begin, children housed in adult facilities lack the educational and 
rehabilitation services that they need during a critical period of development.257 Even 
more acute is the concern that juveniles in adult facilities are subject to physical and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
252Ashley Nellis, The Sentencing Project, Addressing the Collateral Consequences of Convictions for 
Young Offenders, 35-AUG Champion 20 (2011); see also T.J. Parsell, In Prison, Teenagers Become Prey, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 5,2012, available at: http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2012/06/05/when-to-
punish-a-young-offender-and-when-to-rehabilitate/in-prison-teenagers-become-prey.  
253 Dept. of Just., Bur. Just. Assist., Juveniles in Adult Prisons and Jails, A National Assessment, 2000 
[hereinafter Juveniles in Adult Prisons], available at: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bja/182503.pdf.  
254 Juveniles in Adult Prisons, 5 (citing a 366% change in number of juveniles in adult jails).  
255 Juveniles in Adult Prisons, 6 (citing growth in juvenile admissions to adult prisons from 3400 in 1985 to 
7400 in 1997). 
256 Equal Justice Initiative, Children in Prison, available at http://www.eji.org/childrenprison; see also 
Campaign for Youth Justice, Key Facts: Children in Adult Jails and Prisons, available at 
http://www.campaignforyouthjustice.org/documents/KeyFactsonYouthinAdultJailsandPrisons.pdf; Bureau 
of Justice Statistics, Table 21 (reporting that in 2008 there were 3,650 inmates under 18 housed in state 
prisons), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/pim08st.pdf).   
257 Campaign for Youth Justice, Key Facts: Children in Adult Jails and Prisons, supra note 256. 
Spring	  2015	  
Do	  Not	  Cite	  Without	  Author’s	  Permission	  
	   58	  
sexual victimization. When Congress passed the Prison Rape Elimination Act (“PREA”) 
in 2003, it found that “more than any other group of incarcerated persons, youth 
incarcerated with adults are probably at the highest risk for sexual abuse.”258 Since then, 
the trend only has worsened. A recent Justice Department study found that juvenile 
inmates suffer higher rates of staff sexual assault than adult inmates do, and the reported 
numbers are thought to be low.259 Moreover, because of their physical and emotional 
immaturity, juveniles among adult inmates are most likely to be subject to physical 
assault and coercion.260  Based on his own experience as a juvenile housed in an adult 
facility, T.J. Parsell, recounts that: “At the time I was sent to prison, for robbing a 
Fotomat with a toy gun, I was still a boy — physically, cognitively, socially and 
emotionally — and ill equipped to respond to the sexualized coercion of older, more 
experienced convicts. On my first day, I was drugged, gang raped and turned into sexual 
chattel.”261 And he notes that his experience was not an outlier because “juveniles [are] 
five times as likely to be sexually assaulted in adult rather than in juvenile facilities — 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
258  Campaign for Youth Justice, Key Facts: Children in Adult Jails and Prisons, supra note 256 (citing 
National Prison Rape Elimination Commission, Report 18 (June 2009), available at 
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/226680.pdf.).  
259 Aviva Shen, Teenagers in Adult Prisons More Likely to Be Sexually Abused by Staff, DOJ Finds, May 
16, 2013, available at: http://thinkprogress.org/justice/2013/05/16/2023511/teenagers-in-adult-prisons-
more-likely-to-be-sexually-abused-by-staff-doj-finds/.  
 
260 By way of illustration, see the recent lawsuit that was filed in Michigan where state law permits 
juveniles as young as 13 to be incarcerated alongside adults. The lawsuit alleges appalling instances of 
sexual and physical assault. Naomi Spencer, Widespread Abuse of Juvenile Inmates in Michigan Prisons, 
Dec. 14, 2013 (“According to federal data, incarcerated youth are eight times more likely to be subjected to 
sexual violence in adult facilities.”), available at: http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/12/14/mich-
d14.html . The United States is also suing over the treatment of adolescents at Rikers, the nation’s second-
largest jail. Benjamin Weiser et al, U.S. Plans to Sue New York over Rikers Island Conditions, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 18. 2014, available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/19/nyregion/us-plans-to-sue-new-york-over-
rikers-island-conditions.html?_r=0.  
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often within their first 48 hours of incarceration.”262 In short, life for a juvenile within an 
adult correctional institutional is a daily quest for survival.   
Ironically, some adult correctional institutions recognize that youth are unsafe 
among the general inmate population, and they place youth in solitary confinement  -- a 
condition which can be equally, if not more harmful, to juveniles. Adults in solitary 
confinement can suffer psychological trauma.263  For juveniles, who are at a critical stage 
of development, the outcomes can be devastating, including depression, anxiety and 
psychosis.264 Most juvenile suicides that happen within correctional facilities occur 
within solitary confinement.265 For these reasons, the United Nations passed a resolution 
in 1990 prohibiting the use of solitary confinement for juveniles.266 More recently, the 
American Academy of Child & Adolescent Psychiatry opposed the use of juvenile 
solitary confinement and stated that youth held in isolation for more than twenty-four 
hours should be evaluated by a mental health professional.267 Countless social scientists 
have joined the chorus of objection to juvenile solitary confinement, and yet the practice 
persists. 
In the wake of Miller, juvenile justice advocates should seize upon the Supreme 
Court’s moral leadership and argue that, because children are now constitutionally 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
262 Id. (citing Congressional findings related to the Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003). 
263 See generally Craig Haney and Mona Lynch, Regulating Prisons of the Future: A Psychological 
Analysis of Supermax and Solitary Confinement, 23 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 477 (1997); Shira E. 
Gordon, Note: Solitary Confinement, Public Safety and Recidivism, 47 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 495 (2014).  
264 American Acad. of Child and Adolescent Psych., Solitary Confinement of Juvenile Offenders, April 




266 United Nations General Assembly, United Nations Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of 
their Liberty, Dec. 14, 1990, available at: http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/45/a45r113.htm. 
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different, their conditions of confinement, no less than their sentencing, must reflect that 
difference.268 Several organizations have called for the abolition of housing juveniles 
with adults in jail and prison,269 and New York city officials recently agreed to prohibit 
the use of solitary confinement for inmates under the age of twenty-one.270 Change is 
afoot on juvenile conditions of confinement, and post-Miller, the time is ripe for making 
that change a reality. 
Conclusion 
In this Article, I have argued that Miller has revolutionized juvenile justice. 
Specifically, I have developed two corollaries that flow logically from the Miller trilogy: 
the creation of procedural safeguards for children facing LWOP comparable to those 
recommended for adults facing the death penalty and the elimination of mandatory 
minimums for children. I have also identified three key areas for reform post-Miller that 
are farther away on the horizon, but attainable nonetheless: transfer law reform, revised 
presumptive sentencing guidelines for youth, and improved juvenile conditions of 
confinement. 
By way of conclusion, I want to recognize two realities. First, it is important to 
note that there are many good reasons for state actors to pursue the juvenile justice 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
268 Andrea Wood, Comment: Cruel and Unusual Punishment: Confining Juveniles with Adults after 
Graham and Miller, 61 EMORY L.J. 1445 (2012). 
269 Liz Ryan, Prison Rape Elimination Act Can Keep Children Out Of Adult Jails, Huffington Post, March 
18, 2013, available at: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/03/18/prison-rape-elimination-
act_n_2901001.html (citing consensus among various stakeholders that juveniles should not be housed with 
adult inmates).  
270 Michael Winerip and Michael Schwirtz, Rikers to Ban Isolation for Inmates 21 and Younger, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 13, 2015, available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/14/nyregion/new-york-city-to-end-
solitary-confinement-for-inmates-21-and-under-at-rikers.html.  	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practices that I have proposed herein, and many of these reasons have nothing to do with 
the Miller opinion. The fact is, our nation’s juvenile justice practices had spun out of 
control, and even in the absence of the Miller decision, holistic rethinking is in order. The 
Miller decision, while significant, does not offer outlier insights. Rather, the decision 
confirms what advocates and academics have known for years. Kids are different; they 
change by definition; and society has an obligation to foster improvement over 
entrenched criminal behavior.    
Second, arguably, the Miller trilogy represents the Court’s efforts to bring the law 
into step with the direction of juvenile justice reform at the state level. As Professor 
Elizabeth Scott explains, in the early 21st century, there has been a marked dissipation of 
the “moral panic” of the 1990’s: “Many lawmakers and politicians--from the Supreme 
Court to big city mayors--appear ready to rethink the punitive approach of the 1990s, and 
recent surveys indicate strong public support for a rehabilitative approach to teenage 
crime.”271 In the two years since Miller was decided, there are already some signs that 
state actors are reading Miller expansively and accepting the Court’s invitation to re-think 
juvenile sentencing. Delaware, Hawaii, Massachusetts, Texas, West Virginia and 
Wyoming have abolished the practice of juvenile LWOP in the wake of Miller, while 
other states have precluded the sentence for certain categories of juvenile offenders.272  A 
majority of state courts that have considered whether Miller applies retroactively have 
concluded that it must.273 And prominent leaders have spoken publicly about the cruelty, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
271 Elizabeth S. Scott, Miller v. Alabama and the (Past and) Future of Juvenile Crime Regulation, 31 Law 
& Ineq. 535, 541.  
272 Campaign for the Fair Sentencing of Youth, Graphic: Reforms Since Miller, available at: 
http://fairsentencingofyouth.org/2014/06/25/two-years-since-miller-v-alabama/.  
273 Jody Kent Lavy, Signs of Hope And Justice Two Years after Miller v. Alabama, July 8, 2014, available 
at: http://jjie.org/signs-of-hope-and-justice-two-years-after-miller-v-alabama/107244/.  
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inhumanity and general senselessness of juvenile LWOP in the two years since the Miller 
decision. In many ways, the Miller revolution is underway.  
 
